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UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW SPRING 2011
The Man Behind the Curtain: Confronting Expert Testimony
Daniel W. Edwards,
"The Court does not seek to cast aspersions upon the State Police or their technicians in
making these observations but rather to underscore the fact that we must beware of putting
too much trust in the man behind the curtain. Doing so threatens to undermine one of the
fundamental trial protections defendants have enjoyed since this nation's founding.' 2
1. INTRODUCTION
While Melendez-DiaZ 3 addressed the Confrontation Clause and the issue of the
introduction into evidence of testimonial certificates from experts, the Crawford4-Davis 5-
Melendez-Diaz line of cases do not address the issue of an expert's reliance on evidence that is
otherwise inadmissible in forming their opinions or inferences. Even more importantly, these
cases do not address the issue of permitting testimony at trial that involves inadmissible facts and
data essential to the basis of the expert's opinion. This article first addresses the historical
underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause and its current interpretation, and the historical and
current status of experts is explored. In defining whether evidence is "testimonial," it is suggested
that Justice Scalia's "objective witness" standard should be replaced with a "reasonable
defendant" standard. The following issues are also raised and addressed: First, when it comes to
experts, is someone - anyone - to provide testimony sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause? Justice Thomas' limiting interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is considered as a
possible solution in determining what may be testimonial and, therefore, what may be required
to satisfy confrontation rights of a criminal defendant as it relates to experts. Second, whether
business and public records are testimonial and, if testimonial, to what extent their use should be
permitted at trial. The appropriate evidentiary analysis is explored with Fed. Rule Evid. 402 being
a possible starting point in the confrontation analysis. Third, whether the balancing test in Fed.
Rule Evid. 703 or an appropriately-fashioned limiting instruction under Fed. Rule Evid. 105 is
sufficient to protect a criminal defendant's confrontation. Carefully drafted jury instructions that
clearly advise jurors of the responsibility to be fact-finders are necessary for the protection of a
criminal defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Finally, this article seeks solutions to the
problem of introducing an expert's inadmissible facts or data as the basis for an opinion or
inference.
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Described as an "essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is
this country's constitutional goal," 6 the right to confront witnesses in a criminal case originates in
the Sixth Amendment and was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
I Adjunct Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver, teaching in the areas of Evidence, Criminal
Procedure, and Trial Practice. Practitioner of criminal law in Colorado as a public defender, criminal
defense attorney, and prosecutor since 1977.
2 People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (N.Y. City Ct. 2010).
3 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
4 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
6 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
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Amendment.7 The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.. .to be confronted with the witnesses against him...." The clause
has been interpreted as a "preference for face-to-face accusation."8 Confrontation has been
interpreted (1) to insure that statements presented to the jury are given under oath; (2) to force
the witness against the defendant to submit to cross-examination; and (3) to test the credibility
of the witness through the jurors' ability to view the demeanor of the witness as he testifies.9 The
citizens of the various States determined that the right was so important that it was included in
State constitutions, either using the language of the Sixth Amendment as a right to "confront" or
be "confronted,"10 or as a right to meet the witnesses against the defendant "face to face."11
7 Id. at 406.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
9 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
10 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right ... to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.....); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11 ("The accused is entitled ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.....); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10 ('In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.....); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15
("The defendant in a criminal cause has the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against the
defendant.'); CONN. CONST. art I, § 8 ('In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right ... to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.....); FLA. CONST. art., I § 16(a) ("In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall ... have the right ... to confront at trial adverse witnesses....); GA. CONST. art I, § 1, para. xiv
(" Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state ... shall be confronted with the
witnesses testifying against such person."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14 ('In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against the accused...."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8 ('In
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him
or her...."); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 10 ('In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of
an individual the accused shall have a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."); LA.
CONST. art. I, § 16 ("An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him...."); ME.
CONST. art. 1, § 6 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right ... to be confronted by the
witnesses against the accused.....); MD. CONST. art. XXI ("That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."); MICH. CONST. ch. 1, art. 1, § 20 ('In every
criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him or
her...."); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...."); MIss. CONST. art. Ill, § 26 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right ... to be
confronted by the witnesses against him...."); N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 10 ('In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.....); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14
("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23 ('In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has
the right ... to confront the accusers and witnesses..."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20 ('He shall ... be confronted
with the witnesses against him.....); PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ('In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10 ('In all criminal
prosecutions, accused persons shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
them.....); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("Any person charged with an offense shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.....); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("He ... shall be confronted by the
witnesses against him...."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
... to be confronted by the witnesses against him...."); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("That in criminal prosecutions a
man hath a right ... to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses..."); VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 10 ("That in
all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a person hath a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses....').
II See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. II, §24 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ... to meet the
witnesses against him face to face.....); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.....); DEL. CONST. art.1, § 7 ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused hath a right ... to meet the witnesses in their examination face to face.....); KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10 ('In all prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed ... to meet the witness face to
face.... ); KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11 ('In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right ... to meet the
witnesses face to face.....); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12 ("And every subject shall have a right ... to meet the
witnesses against him face to face...."); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) ("That in criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.....); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24
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In 1895 the United States Supreme Court addressed the right to confrontation in Mattox v.
United States. 12 Although the case itself concerned the use of testimony from a former trial of
the same action where two witnesses died before the second trial, 13 the Court held:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or
ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.14
But even the Mattox court perceived that the "general rules of law" "must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." 15 The Court held that
exclusion of transcripts of the witnesses' testimony, even though the defendant did not have a
current opportunity to cross-examine, "would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent." 16
The Confrontation Clause has never been interpreted literally to require that any and all
information from any source be produced through the testimony of a witness available for cross-
examination. Because it has never been so interpreted, the analysis of the Confrontation Clause
has always been a matter of line-drawing. Legal line-drawing must be based upon a rational
basis and have criteria that requires just results.
Thus, to come as close to the language of the Confrontation Clause and in the usual
case, the prosecution must produce the witness for cross-examination or demonstrate the
unavailability of that witness.17  Under Ohio v. Roberts, now superseded by Crawford v.
Washington18, to be admissible a statement where the witness was unavailable required a
showing of "indicia of reliability." 19 Under Roberts, statements were presumed reliable if they
came within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," 20 or there was a showing of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." 2 1 In Roberts, the prosecution sought to admit the preliminary
hearing transcript of a witness who did not appear at trial. 22 An out-of-court statement was
admissible and the Confrontation Clause satisfied only if the witness was unavailable and the
statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 23
("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to
face.....); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15 ("Every subject shall have a right ... to meet the witnesses against him
face to face.....); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10 ('In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed ... to
meet the witnesses face to face.....); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face...."); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7 ('In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face...."); TENN. CONST. art. I, §
9 ("That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face.... );
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses
against him face to face....').
12 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
13 Id. at 240.
14 Id. at 242-43.
i
5 /d. at 243.
i6 Id.
17 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
18 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).




22 Id. at 59.
23 Id. at 66.
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Crawford changed the Confrontation Clause analysis.24 The Court changed the second
step of the analysis from "indicia of reliability" to "prior opportunity to cross-examine" the
declarant. The analysis created by Crawford requires two things. First, the examination of any
out-of-court to determine whether the statement is testimonial. 25 A statement is testimonial if the
statement was "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to
reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 26 Second, if
the statement is determined to be testimonial, there must have been a prior opportunity for the
defendant to have cross-examined the witness.27 Stated another way, where the issue is
testimonial evidence, the "Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination." 28
Davis v. Washington provided an exception or clarification to the meaning of
"testimonial."2 9 In response to the issue of whether an emergency 911 call was testimonial, the
Court held that "statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." 30 The Court referred back to the
Crawford decision in noting the perimeters of the Confrontation Clause: (1) a witness is
someone who bears testimony, and (2) testimony is a "solemn declaration or affirmation" for the
purpose of proving a fact.3 1 Whether a statement is testimonial is an objective inquiry.32
However, a statement that begins objectively to be for the primary purpose of an emergency
may evolve into a statement with the primary purpose of future prosecution.33
Professor Michael Graham has described the current state of the Confrontation Clause
by defining testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes:
An out-of-court statement is 'testimonial' only if hearsay as defined in Fed. Rule Evid.
801 (a)-(d) and the statement was made by, or made to, or elicited by a police officer,
other law enforcement personnel, or a judicial officer under circumstances objectively
indicating at the time made that the primary purpose to which the statement will be used
by the government is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later
criminal prosecution.34
The Professor describes the current interpretation of the Confrontation Clause to be
"theoretically unsound, inconsistent, confused, and illogical." 35
The United States Supreme Court first considered the interplay between expert witnesses and
the Confrontation Clause in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 36 With the Crawford and Davis
decisions behind them, the Court was now faced with a situation where affidavits reporting the
substance and weight of a controlled substance were introduced in evidence and not through
live testimony.37 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that "there is little doubt that the
documents at issue in this case fall within the 'core class of testimonial statements'" prohibited
24 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
2 5 Id. at 51-52
26 Id. at 52.
27 Id. at 53-54
28 Id. at 68.
29 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 823-24 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
32 Id. at 826.
33 Id. at 828-29.
34Michael H. Graham, Justice Scalia's Fundamentally Flowed Confrontation Clause Analysis Continues in
Melendez-Diaz: It's Time to Begin All Over Again, 45 Crim. L. Bull. 6 (2009).
35 Id.
36 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2530-31 (2009).
37 Id.
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by the Confrontation Clause. 38 Under the objective analysis, a reasonable person would have
believed that those affidavits would be available for use at a criminal trial. 3 9 The Court held that
the statements were testimonial and that the analysts were "witnesses" for Confrontation Clause
purposes.40 Thus to be admissible against the defendant, the prosecution would have to show
two things: that the witness was unavailable and that the defendant had been afforded a prior
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.41
Justice Scalia addressed six specific arguments that were made by the prosecution and/or
by the defendant. First, the argument was made that the forensic analysts were not
"accusatory" witnesses and therefore the Confrontation Clause did not apply.42 The Court
rejected this argument and held that there are two types of witnesses at trial and that are
addressed in the constitution: first, there are witnesses against the defendant, for which the
Confrontation Clause applies, and second, there are witnesses for the defendant, for which the
compulsory process clause applies.43
Second, the argument was made that the analysts were not "conventional," "typical," or
"ordinary" witnesses. 44 The argument goes that the conventional witness was recalling past
events while the analysts were reporting on their contemporary observations.45 Further the
argument was made that the statements were not made in response to interrogation and
therefore the Confrontation Clause did not apply.46 The Court rejected all of these arguments
stating that analysts were "witnesses" and that affidavits were testimonial. 47
Third, the difference between recounting historical events and memorializing neutral
scientific fact was cited as a reason why the Confrontation Clause should not apply to the
analysts. 4 8 Justice Scalia called this reasoning nothing more than a call to return to the test for
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" adopted in Roberts but later rejected in
Crawford. 49 The Court held that the Confrontation Clause "commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination."50 Confrontation is necessary because it cannot only discover the fraudulent
analyst, but also ferret out the incompetent ones.5 1
Fourth, the analysts' affidavits were neither public records or business records admissible
without confrontation.52 While many documents may be admissible as public or business
records, ones that are created specifically for use at this trial do not fall within those
exceptions.53 The documents are not primarily created for the use in the business or in the
agency, but rather are primarily created for use in court.54 The test for whether the
Confrontation Clause applies to public or business records is whether they were "prepared
specifically for use at [the defendant's] trial."55




42 Id. at 2533.
43 Id. at 2534.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2535.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2536
49 Id.
50 Id.




5s /d. at 2540.
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Fifth, it was argued that the defendant at trial could have subpoenaed the analysts. This
argument was dealt short shrift when the Court indicated that it is the prosecution who has the
burden of proof and the responsibility for calling witnesses.56
Sixth, and last, the argument was made that in an age where there are analysts and experts
in almost every trial, the "necessities of trial and the adversary process," will simply cause the
criminal justice system to collapse if the prosecution is required to call all of those witnesses.5 7
Justice Scalia found that many jurisdictions were already complying with the dictates of
Crawford and that the sky was not falling now or going to fall because the Confrontation Clause
requires live testimony.5 8
III. EXPERTS
Experts in the trial courts in America have a long history. As early as 1876, the United
States Supreme Court was making the distinction between, on one hand, subjects that were a
matter of common observation "upon which the lay or uneducated mind is capable of forming
a judgment" and, on the other hand, questions that require an expert because "in such
questions scientific men have superior knowledge."5 9 The key requirement for experts was that
their testimony would "assist the court or jury in reaching a correct conclusion."60
The focus for the fact-finder was always upon whether the facts underlying the opinion
were true and proven at trial. 6 1  One way an expert could perceive the facts underlying his
opinion was through personal observation. The party opposing the expert could cross-examine
the witness concerning the expert's own personal knowledge of facts.
The expert could be asked hypothetical questions, but jurors were instructed to carefully
look to the facts that supported the question and " [i]f the statements in these questions are not
supported by the proof, then the answers to the questions are entitled to no weight, because
[they are] based upon false assumptions or [false] statements of facts." 62 "[T]he opinions of
these experts depend very largely upon the truth of the hypothetical case that counsel on the
one side and on the other have seen proper to put to the witnesses during their
examination...."63 Jurors were forewarned to "...be careful to ascertain what the evidence
establishes as to the truth of the one or the other of these different hypothetical cases put by
counsel to the witnesses on the examinations." 64 The jury was left to decide whether the facts
assumed in a hypothetical question were both true and proven. 65
Even now, some jurisdictions specifically instruct the jury that part of their decision making




s9 Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1876).
60 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 618 (1884).
61 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891).
62 Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 77 (1887).
63 Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405, 414 (1888).
64 Id. at 415.
65 Gottlieb v. Hartman, 3 Colo. 53, 63 (Colo. Terr. 1876) (citing Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N.Y. 12 (N.Y. 1878).
66 See, e.g., JUDICIALCOUNCILOF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CACI) 220 (2003), ('In determining the
weight to give to the expert's opinion that is based on the assumed facts, you should consider whether the
assumed facts are true."); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 2.82 (2005), in pertinent part,
(I)t is for you to decide from all the evidence whether or not the facts assumed in a hypothetical
question have been proved. If you should decide that any assumption in a question has not been
proved, you are to determine the effect of that failure of proof on the value and weight of the expert
opinion based on the assumed facts.
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BAJI 2.42 (2003), ("It is for you to decide
from all the evidence whether or not the facts assumed in a hypothetical question have been proved.");
ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, APJI 15.08, ( (f)irst examine carefully all the material facts stated in the
DANIEL W. EDWARDS
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the United States required the ability to test the expert opinion: an expert's personal
observations would be subject to cross-examination, and if the expert was asked a hypothetical
question, those underlying facts were subject to being proven at trial through some other
method, usually witness testimony, and that testimony was subject to cross-examination.
Up to this point in the development of the utilization of experts at trial, jurors had the
ability to make credibility determinations based upon the cross-examination of a live witness:
either the expert himself or some other witness that testified to the underlying facts. Somewhere
along the development of expert testimony, the notion that the underlying facts had to be
proven as substantive evidence got lost.
Under the Federal Rules, expert analysis can be said to include eight considerations:
1. relevance 67
2. assist (fit) 68
3. qualified expert69
4. sufficient facts or data70
5. reliable principles and methods71
6. reliable application72
7. appropriate basis for the opinion, introduced at the appropriate time 73
8. opinion on ultimate issue74
The trial court should consider each of these steps in turn before admitting expert testimony.
Occasionally, trial courts have permitted an expert to discuss reliable principles and methods
hypothetical questions and be reasonably satisfied that they have substantially been proved to be true.");
and, for example, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 2.8 (2010), in pertinent part,
An expert witness is permitted to consider statements made to the witness or a third person that have
not been made under oath in court. Statements considered by an expert witness which were made
to the witness or a third person do not prove that what was said was true. The truth of those
statements may come from other evidence. You should consider the failure to prove in court that it
was made or is true in determining what weight to give to the opinion of the expert.
NEW JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGES 1.13(A) (1995), ("You must determine if any fact assumed by the witness
has not been proved and the effect of that omission, if any, upon the weight of the expert's opinion."); NEW
MEXICO UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, (UJI) 14-5051 (2010),
You must find all the evidence whether or not the assumed facts have been proved. If you should
find that any assumption has not been proved, you are to determine the effect of that failure of proof
on the value and weight of the expert opinion based on the assumption.
PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 4.10(B) (2001),
The value of an opinion given in response to a hypothetical question depends on various things,
including how close the assumptions made are to the true facts. One of your tasks, as jurors, is to
determine from all the evidence, whether or not the [facts] [testimony] assumed for a hypothetical
question [have been] [has been] proven to be true. If you find that any of the assumed [facts have]
[testimony has] not been proven, you should determine how that affects the value and weight of the
expert witness's opinion.
67 FED. R. EVID. 401, 401.





73 FED. R. EVID. 703, 705.
74 FED. R. EVID. 704.
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without testifying to the application and/or express an opinion in the particular case.75 Expert
testimony, of course, is subject to Fed. Rule Evid. 403 considerations as well.7 6
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence codified the move from the underlying
facts having to be proven to a principle that as long as the facts were "reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences" the facts were admissible. Currently,
expert testimony in the Federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 702
through 706. Rule 703 concerning the bases of an expert's opinion states, in pertinent part:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.77
Many states adopted this precise language and continue to utilize it in their statute or rules of
evidence.78
Some courts have interpreted the second sentence of the Rule as not only permitting the
opinion to be based upon facts or data "reasonably relied upon by experts" in the field, but also
permitting the expert to testify to facts or data that are not admissible.79  A competing
interpretation is that while the expert could rely upon information that was otherwise
inadmissible, that evidence could not be revealed by the expert on direct examination.80 The
75 See, e.g., United States v. Smead, 317 Fed. Appx. 457, 464-65 (6th Cir. 2008) (excluding expert testimony in
part); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311-12, 314 (6th Cir. 2000) (reciting historical use of eyewitness
expert testimony and indicating that the expert testimony could be offered on the subject of psychological
factors which influence memory).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d. 321, 338 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that after the Rule 702 analysis
the court turns to a Rule 403 evaluation).
77 FED. R. EvID. 703.
78 ALASKA. R. EvID. 703; IoWA. R. EvID. 5.703; LA. CODE EVID. ART.703; ME. R. EvID. 703; MONT. CODE. ANN. 703; NEV. REV.
STAT., 50.285; N.H. R.EVID. 703; N.J. R. EvID. 703; N.C. GEN. STAT. G.S. §8C-1, RULE 702; OR. REV. STAT., §40.415, RULE
703; PA. R. EvID. 703; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 19-15-3, RULE 703; TEX. R. EvID. 703; WASH. R. EvID. 703; W. VA. R. EvID. 703.
79 United States v. Pablo, No. 09-2091, 2010 WL 4609188 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 2010)
(therefore, where an expert witness discloses otherwise inadmissible out-of-court testimonial
statements on which she based her opinion, the admission of those testimonial statements under Rule
703 typically will not implicate a defendant's confrontation rights because the statements are not
admitted for their substantive truth.
People v. Leach, No. 1-07-1448, 2010 WL 4629056 (III.App. Nov. 12, 2010) (holding that "while the contents of
reports and records relied upon by experts may be disclosed, an expert may also testify as to nontestifying
experts' findings and conclusions."); Foster v. State, No. 49AO4-0908-CR-435.930, 2010 WL 2983133 (Ind.App.
2010) (holding that the underlying basis may be disclosed under a three-part test: first, sufficient expertise;
second, 'the report is of the type normally found reliable," and third, the information is customarily relied
upon by experts in the field."); Gardner v. United States, 999 A.2d 55, 59-60 (D.C. 2010) (permitting the
hearsay underlying basis as long as a limiting instruction is given); Miller v. State, No. CR 08-1297 2010 WL
129708 (Ark. Jan. 7, 2010) (holding that the underlying basis for an expert opinion was hearsay, the
evidence was allowed to be presented on direct because it was 'critical in rendering a forensic
evaluation"); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 957-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 'the trial court (has)
discretion to permit an expert to relate hearsay or otherwise inadmissible evidence to the jury for the limited
purpose of explaining the reasons for his or her opinion."); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 390, 413
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding "an expert witness whose opinion is based on such inadmissible matter can,
when testifying, describe the material that forms the basis of the opinion."); People v. Leach, 908 N.E.2d
120, 131 (III. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that admissible facts, including another expert's findings and
conclusion for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for an expert opinion).
so United States v. Williams, No. 09-0026, 2010 WL 4071538 (D.C. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that the a forensic
pathologist could use another pathologist's autopsy report as a basis for his opinion, that basis could not be
revealed on direct examination); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106 (Mass. 2010) (permitting
an expert to base his opinion on testimonial evidence from non-testifying witnesses, but prohibiting
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question arose whether Rule 703 then became another hearsay exception or an unwritten
method for circumventing hearsay. Some courts attempt to get around this interpretation by
holding that the evidence was admissible only as it went to the basis of the expert's opinion,
and, therefore, was not being admitted for its truth. But if the underlying facts and data are not
true, the expert's opinion would be irrelevant and subject to a Rule 403 exclusion.
In criminal cases, these questions implicate the Confrontation Clause. Under the
common law of evidence, the Confrontation Clause was not an issue because the expert was
required to have personal knowledge that could be tested by cross-examination. Alternatively,
the expert could be asked a hypothetical question and the facts contained in the question
were subject to proof at trial. The expansion of the basis for the expert opinion to include other
evidence "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field" 81 opened the floodgates to
unconfronted evidence.82
The Supreme Court sought to control the flood of unconfronted facts by the 2000
Amendment to Fed. Rule Evid. 403. The amendment added a sentence to the rule:
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.83
Several states adopted the new balancing test into their statutes or court rules of evidence.84
The comments to the rule indicate the limited purpose of the "otherwise inadmissible"
facts or data.85 The comment warns that the jury must be instructed that the basis for the
opinion is not admissible as substantive evidence (i.e., for its truth) but rather only as the basis of
the opinion.86
Looked at from another angle, in order for the facts or data to support an opinion, the
facts or data must be true, or there must at least be a good-faith argument that the matters are
true. One problem arises when an expert testifies to the testing that another expert performed:
the basis is assumed to be true and there is no opportunity to cross-examine the original expert,
the "man behind the curtain."
Under the Rule, the expert may use any evidence that is "reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." 87 Those facts
"need not be admissible," but if they are "otherwise inadmissible," the proponent is not
permitted to ask the expert on direct examination, and the expert is not permitted to disclose
them to the jury, unless a special balancing test is met.8 8 That balancing test is whether the
disclosure except on cross-examination); United States v. Gray, No. 3:09 CR 182, 2010 WL 3515599
(N.D.Ohio, Sept. 3, 2010) (experts may use the testimonial statements of non-testifying witnesses as the basis
of the opinion, but may not reveal them on direct examination); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (holding that disclosure of information from non-testifying pathologist's autopsy report was
a violation of confrontation, but that the expert could use it as an undisclosed basis for his opinion).
81 FED. R. EvID. 703.
82 But see MICH. R. EvID. 703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases and opinion or inference shall be
in evidence. This rule does not restrict the discretion of the court to receive expert opinion testimony
subject to the condition that the factual bases of the opinion be admitted in evidence thereafter.
83 FED. R. EvID. 703.
84 ARIz. R. EvID. 703; COLO. R. EvID. 703; N.D. R. EvID. 703; OKL.ST.ANN. §2703; UTAH. R. EvID. 703.
85 FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee notes (amended 2000).
86 
Id.
87 FED. R. EvID. 703
88 Id.
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"probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect."89
Prior to the amendment, courts and commentators had reached different conclusions
on how to treat this information. "The amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to
the jury of information used as the basis for an expert's opinion and not admissible for any
substantive purpose, when the information is offered by the proponent of the expert."90
The underlying basis for the opinion can be "otherwise inadmissible" for any number of
reasons. For example and pertinent here, although overlooked by the cases, the underlying
basis may not be admissible because its admission might violate the defendant's right to
confront the witnesses against him. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had this to say about
disclosure of the bases for expert opinions: "(T)he thorny question of what to do with
inadmissible evidence that experts rely upon as a basis for an opinion is one that has proved
difficult to answer with a fair and workable rule." 91
Some courts indicate that the underlying basis is not being admitted for its truth, but
rather as the underlying basis of the opinion.92 For example, the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
PablO 9 3 held that a defendant's right to confrontation usually would not be implicated where
the expert uses, as the basis of his own opinion, otherwise inadmissible out-of-court testimonial
statements.94 The type and quantity of testimonial testimony permitted, however, is a question
of degree.95 The expert cannot testify as a mere conduit of the non-testifying expert's
knowledge and opinion becuase the purpose for introducing the evidence is for its truth and,
therefore, a Confrontation Clause violation.96 However, if the expert has formed his own opinion
based upon the non-testifying expert's report, introduction of the report is for the factfinder to be
able to test the underlying basis for the opinion, and, therefore, it does not violate the
Confrontation Clause.97
In Pablo, one expert was permitted to testify to statements contained in another expert's
DNA report and to a third expert's serology report.98 The defendant complained that his right to
confront the other experts had been violated by the introduction of the evidence of the two
non-testifying experts because the testifying witness was a mere conduit. The trial court, under
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, was then required to determine whether the testifying expert was
merely a conduit for the other expert's reports or whether the expert had formed her own
opinion and, therefore, was only using the other expert's reports as the basis for her own
opinion.99 The Tenth Circuit avoided resolving the underlying issue by finding there was no plain
error. 100 The Court also noted that Melendez-Diaz did not clearly resolve the issue.
The degree to which an expert may merely rely upon, and reference during her in-court
testimony, the out-of-court testimonial conclusions of another person not called as a
89 Id.
90 2000 Amendment Commentary, construed in FED. R. EvID 703.
91 Wisconsin v. Fischer, 322 N.W.2d 629, 637 (Wis. 2010).
92 Gardner v. United States, 999 A.2d 55, 59-60 (D.C. 2010); Marshall v. Oklahoma, 232 P.3d 467, 474-75
(Okla. Crim. App. 2010); New Mexico v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010); Washington v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948,
957 (Wash. App. 2009) (holding that "to the extent the experts here related testimonial hearsay statements
to the jury, they did so to explain the bases for their opinions."); Wood v. Texas, 299 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009); California v. Nguyen, No. H026581, 2005 WL 2064165 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2005).
93 United States v. Pablo, No. 09-2091, 2010 WL 4609188 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 2010).
94 Id. at 4.
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witness is a nuanced legal issue without clearly established bright line parameters. Even
today with the benefit of Melendez-Diaz.101
This reasoning skips steps in evidentiary analysis and has the basic flaw that the expert,
the court, and the jurors assume that the underlying basis is true. If it is not true, then the
underlying bases would be inadmissible because they are not relevant. While there certainly
can be matters of fact that may be true or not true under a good faith analysis, the decision of
whether the facts are true is a chore for the factfinder and should not be left to the expert's
discretion. Often the testifying expert will not have sufficient personal knowledge of the facts
when he is testifying based on someone else's report and, therefore, not have a sufficient basis
for a valid exploration into the facts through cross-examination by the defense. Criminal
defendants claim it is those underlying facts that they have a right to confront.
IV. POINT OF VIEW
Justice Scalia in Crawford adopted the following standard for testimonial statements:
statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 102 The only
authority for the citation was a National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and American
Civil Liberties Union amicus brief. 103 The brief itself sets out a standard only in two places, in the
introduction 104 and in the argument without any authority cited. 105 In fact, Justice Scalia
adopted only the first statement of the proposed rule, while the second recitation stated, "an
out-of-court statement is testimonial only when the circumstances indicate that a reasonable
declarant at the time would understand that the statement would later be available for use at a
criminal trial." While Justice Scalia adopted the standard, the standard's reference to an
"objective witness" has no firm roots in legal precedent. Notwithstanding its lack of an firm
foundation, Justice Scalia reiterated the standard in Melendez-Diaz. 106
This standard simply does not work. Any witness, lay or expert, after rational reflection,
would believe that any statement made to the government could be used in a later
prosecution. The pathologist who performs an autopsy at the request of law enforcement knows
that the report could be used in a later prosecution. The analyst who tests drugs would know
that the report could be used in a later prosecution. The clerk who prepares an affidavit of no
record after a diligent search knows that the affidavit could be used in a later prosecution. The
manufacturer who prepares blood alcohol test kits reasonably knows that the evidence could
be used in a later prosecution. To go to the extreme, manufacturers of blood alcohol testing
machines well know that those machines will be used for blood alcohol testing and that any
statements made by individuals in the manufacturing and testing of the machine could be used
in a later prosecution.
If the Confrontation Clause is going to be interpreted not to require live testimony from
every witness, a position the United States Supreme Court has long taken, 107 a more workable
line needs to be drawn than the point of view of an "objective witness." The Sixth amendment
guarantees that it is the "accused" who "shall enjoy the right" to be confronted with the
witnesses. 108 It is the defendant's right and the focus should not be taken from the defendant
ioi Id. at 7.
102 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2010).
103 Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL') and the American Civil Liberties
Union, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, (2003) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961.
104 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
i
05 /d. at 22.
106 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 U.S. 2527, 2527 (2009).
i
07 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
108 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
DANIEL W. EDWARDS
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL ]LAW REVIEW SPRING 2011
11
13
Criminal Law Review: Full Issue
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2011
and placed upon some "objective witness." However, line drawing must take into consideration
not only the defendant's right to confrontation, but also the efficacy of cross-examination. The
defendant certainly may benefit from the cross-examination of the pathologist or the drug
analyst. The defendant can gain little, if any, benefit from the appearance and cross-
examination of a clerk who found no record, or the manufacturer who prepared the blood
alcohol test kits, or the manufacturer of the blood alcohol testing machine.
Therefore, the point of view should be from a hypothetical reasonable defendant, not
the "objective witness." The question should not be whether the objective witness understands
that the statement could be used at a criminal trial, but rather whether a reasonable defendant
could benefit from cross-examination.
V. Is SOMEONE - ANYONE - TO CROSS-EXAMINE SUFFICIENT?
There is a split of authority on whether it sufficient for someone - anyone - who is an
expert to be put on the witness stand so he can be cross-examined on the work and analysis
done by other experts. If there is any expert witness to examine, some courts have held that is
sufficient to admit the non-testifying expert's opinion or report as the underlying basis for the
expert opinion. 109 This rationale skirts both a hearsay analysis and a confrontation analysis.
After the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Pendergrass v. Indiana, a case where one expert was called to testify to the procedures and
results produced by another expert. 10 Pendergrass was charged with inappropriately touching
his thirteen year old daughter based, in part, on DNA testing.111 The DNA analyst, Daun Powers,
was not called as a witness at trial. 112 Two exhibits were admitted that had been prepared by
Powers: an exhibit labeled "certificate of analysis" and an exhibit labeled "profiles for paternity
analysis." 113 The "certificate of analysis" enumerated the evidence submitted to the laboratory,
a list of tests performed, and a certification of where the test results were sent. 114 The "profiles"
109 See United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation
for admitting expert's testimony based on underlying forensic testing of cocaine); United States v. Williams,
No. 09-0026 (PLF), 2010 WL 4071538, at*4-5 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010) (denying admission of underlying report
serving as basis of expert's opinion); United States v. Mirabal, No. CR 09-3207 JB, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 91595 at
*11-13 (D.N.M. Aug. 7, 2010) (admitting expert testimony based on forensic chemical testing but not
allowing expert to testify to unavailable expert's conclusions); People v. Zayas, No. E048865, 2010 WL
3530426, at 1-2, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010) (admitting discussion of underlying forensic drug analysis at
trial); Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029-30 (Mass. 2009) (holding expert could testify to
opinions based on autopsy report but not direct findings of the report); State v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478, 490
(Me. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation for admitting expert's testimony based on underlying
report); State v. Dilboy, 999 A. 2d. 1092, 1104 (N.H. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation for
admitting expert's testimony based on underlying report); State v. Bullcoming, 2010 NMSC 007, 226 P.3d 1,
8-9 (N.M. 2010) (admitting expert testimony based on underlying forensic testing for alcohol in blood), cert.
granted, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876, 2010 WL 2008002 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010); State v. Hough,
690 S.E.2d 285, 290-91 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation by expert stating
opinion based on underlying reports); Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding no
confrontation clause violation when expert gave opinion based on underlying autopsy reports, but a
confrontation clause violation did occur when autopsy report findings were disclosed). But See People v.
Dendel, No. 247391, 2010 WL 3385552 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010) (holding a confrontation clause
violation by allowing expert opinion based on inadmissible underlying report).
110 Pendergrass v. Indiana, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, Pendergrass v. Indiana, 130 S.Ct. 3409
(2010).
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document contained numbers in columns categorized by abbreviated test labels for each of
the three test subjects: Pendergrass, the daughter, and the fetus. 15
The State did call two witnesses concerning the DNA evidence. Lisa Black, a supervisor
at the laboratory, explained the process of test sampling. 116 She testified that she performed
technical, administrative, and random reviews of work performed by the DNA analysts. 117 She
did a "technical review" of Power's work in this case.118 She relied on Power's notes to testify
about the procedures that were followed in this particular case. 119 Dr. Michael Conneally, a
DNA expert and the only other live expert witness to testify at trial, explained his conclusions and
how he applied the DNA principles. 120 This witness created a paternity index table to calculate
the probability of fatherhood of the fetus based upon the laboratory's test results. 121
The Indiana Supreme Court found no confrontation violation. 122 The Court found that
Black, the laboratory supervisor, "did have a direct part in the process by personally checking
Power's test results." 123 The fact that she looked at the results and could testify about standard
operating procedures were sufficient for the Court to find that there was no confrontation
violation. 124  "Here, the prosecution supplied a supervisor with direct involvement in the
laboratory's technical processes and the expert who concluded that those processes
demonstrate" the defendant was the father.125 The Court concluded that "this sufficed for Sixth
Amendment purposes." 126
The Court further found that although the exhibits might be inadmissible hearsay,
"opinions by qualified experts" "may rely on information supplied by other persons" "even if the
supplier is not present to testify in court." 12 7 The Court stated that the evidence relied upon by
the experts who did testify "might have been subject to a limiting instruction," but that it was not
error to admit them. 128
The Court seemed to be creating some type of exception for experts. However, any
such exception must take into account not only the Rules of Evidence as they relate to experts,
but also confrontation guaranteed by the Constitution. The dissent pointed out,
[the analyst who actually performed the test was] never subject to the rigors of cross-
examination on either the examination she performed, the testing she conducted, or the
results she reached.... Although a supervisor might be able to testify to her charge's
general competence or honesty, this is no substitute for a jury's first-hand observations of
the analyst that performs a given procedure; and a supervisor's initials are no substitute for
an analyst's opportunity to carefully consider, under oath, the veracity of her results. 129
Since 2007, the courts in California since 2007 have been guided by the California






1 9 Id. at 705.
120 Id. at 704.
121 Id. at 705.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 707.
124 Id. at 707-08.
125 Id. at 708.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 708-09.
128 Id. at 709.
129 Id. at 710-11 (Rucker, J. dissenting).
130 California v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, Geier v. California, 129 S.Ct. 2856 (2009).
Interestingly, the denial of certiorari in Geier occurred on June 29, 2009, the Melendez-Diaz opinion issued
June 25, 2009. Before the Geier decision, the California appellate courts had held that autopsy reports
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Crawford, but pre-Melendez-Diaz. Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court
only four days after issuing Melendez-Diaz.
In Geier, the DNA analysis was performed by Paula Yates, a biologist.131 However, the
prosecution chose to only call Dr. Robin Cotton, a DNA expert. 132 Dr. Cotton had "reviewed the
forms" Yates had filled out and Yates handwritten notes, as well as other data in the case. 133 The
defendant objected based upon his right to confront the person who actually did the analysis,
Yates. 134 After reviewing Crawford and the multitude of cases after Crawford, interpreting what
is testimonial, the California Court held that "we are nonetheless more persuaded by those
cases concluding that such evidence is not testimonial..." 13 5 The Court held that Crawford and
post-Crawford opinions required an analysis to determine whether a statement was testimonial
based on three conditions: (1) it is made to law enforcement, (2) it describes a past fact related
to criminal activity, and (3) it was made for possible use at a later trial.136
The Court found that "the crucial point is whether the statement represents the
contemporaneous recordation of observable events." 137  Because Yates' information as
recorded in her report and notes were made as part of an objective and standardized scientific
protocol, they were not made to incriminate the defendant, but as part of Yates' employment
as an objective observer.138 The analyst's records were properly received in evidence because
the testing took place in a "routine, non-adversarial process meant to ensure accurate
analysis." 139 The California Supreme Court thus held that there were two requirements in
overcoming a confrontation issue: first, there must be live testimony from some expert and an
opportunity to cross examine that expert, and second, the report must be a "contemporaneous
recordation of observable events." 140 The Court thus created a someone-anyone exception to
Confrontation.
The Geier analysis, even after Melendez-Diaz, has been utilized by the vast majority of
California cases in addressing such areas as DNA, 141 autopsies, 142 blood alcohol testing1 43 and
drug testing. 144 However, a minority of California Courts of Appeal have held that the Geier
analysis was overruled by the Melendez-Diaz case.145  Both the Indiana Supreme Court in
were admissible either as business records, California v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 167-70 (Cal. 1995), or as public
records, California v. Williams, 345 P.2d. 47,64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
131 Geier, 161 P.3d at 132.
132 Id. at 131.
133 Id. at 132.
134 Id. at 133
135 Id. at 138
136 Id. at 138-39.
137 Id. at 140
138 Id. (quoting People v. Brown,801 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)).
139 Id.
140 California v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007).
141 People v. Suen, 2010 WL 4401796 (Cal.App. 2010) (DNA); People v. Reed, 2010 WL 4324384 (Cal.App.
2010) (DNA) People v. Blueford, 2010 WL 3932799 (Cal.App. 2010) (DNA)
142 See California v. Suen, No. B208155, 2010 WL 4401796, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2010) (DNA);
California v. Reed, No. B216570, 2010 WL 4324384, at *10-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov 3, 2010) (DNA); California v.
Blueford, No. B214908, 2010 WL 3932799, at *12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2010) (DNA).
143 See California v. McKiernan, No. D055374, 2010 WL 3609173, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2010) (blood
alcohol testing).
144 See California v. Zayas, No. E048865, 2010 WL 3530426, at *1-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010) (drug
testing); California v. Bingley, No. B205609, 2009 WL 3595261, at *4-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2009) (drug
testing, distinguishing Melendez-Diaz on ground that in Melendez-Diaz there was no live testimony at all and
therefore no opportunity to cross-examine and that the results of drug testing 'constitutes a
contemporaneous recordation of observable events').
1
45 See California v. Horn, No. SCD184821, 2010 WL 1138836, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2010) (DNA testing
where the witness was a 'reviewing criminalist,' not the person who had performed the analysis); California
v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 702, 710-12 (Cal. Ct. Ap. 2009) (pathologist relied exclusively on autopsy report
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Pendergrass and the California Supreme Court in Geier suggest, if not outright hold, that the
underlying basis of an expert opinion does not have to undergo the crucible of truth-testing that
is cross-examination. The Courts seem to have taken a wrong turn into at least an evidentiary
presumption that the underlying basis of the expert opinion does not have to be true to be
admissible.
Can the defendant's Confrontation Clause right be protected by an adequate cross-
examination conducted of the experts in Pendergrass or Geier? Certainly the experts who testify
can testify on how certain procedures should be performed, but their testimony assumes the
truth of the reports underlying the factual basis. It would not be permissible for a lay person to
testify from the report of another lay person without doing the hearsay and confrontation
analysis. The "someone - anyone" analysis would never satisfy defendant's right to confront
when considering lay witnesses. Why then should it be permissible to have an expert witness
testify from the report of another technician, analyst, or expert?
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari in People v. Dungo to review the use of
the Geier holding.146 The California Court of Appeals in Dungo held that the autopsy report in
that case was testimonial and that relying upon its contents violated the defendant's
confrontation rights. 147 The pathologist who performed the autopsy did not testify at trial. 148 The
prosecution called the employer of the pathologist, himself a pathologist, to testify. 149 The
employer-pathologist was not present at the autopsy and relied exclusively on his employee's
report and photographs of the autopsy to form his independent opinions regarding the cause of
death. 150 During his testimony, the expert was permitted to disclose parts of the autopsy report
from the other expert.15 1 The trial court had held that there was no confrontation issue because
"experts can rely on hearsay to help form their opinions." 152 Further, the otherwise inadmissible
information was not being introduced "for the truth of the matter, that's just what he based his
opinion on." 15 3
The Court of Appeals first found that the autopsy report was testimonial. 154 In finding the
report testimonial, the Court considered the facts of the statutory purpose for the report
(circumstances, manner, and cause of death), the statutory duty to put the report in writing, the
requirement of immediate notification of law enforcement, and the fact that the report was
made during the course of a homicide investigation.155 The Court found "the primary purpose...
of the report was to establish or prove some past fact...." 156
Concerning the use of the autopsy report at trial, the prosecution argued that the report
did not violate either hearsay rules or the Confrontation Clause because the information was not
introduced for its truth but rather as the basis of the opinion.15 7 The Court found that the report
prepared by a different pathologist); California v. Lopez, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 825, 827 (Cal. Ct. Ap. 2009)
(criminalist supervisor testified about blood alcohol determined by an analyst).
146 California v. Dungo, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 (Cal. 2009) (granting certiorari on the following issues: (1) "Was
defendant denied his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment when one forensic pathologist
testified to the manner and cause of death in a murder case based upon an autopsy report prepared by
another pathologist?" (2) "How does the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009) affect this court's decision in California v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal.
2007).").
147 Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 710-11.




151 Id. at 708.
152 Id. at 707.
153 Id.
1
54 Id. at 710.
i
55 /d. at 710-11.
156 Id. at 711.
i
57 Id. at 712.
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was "formally prepared in anticipation of a prosecution," in rejecting the prosecution's
arguments. 15 8 In its charge to the jury, the trial court had instructed in pertinent part that " [y]ou
must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and accurate." 15 9 The jury
was thus required to determine whether the underlying autopsy report was true. "In other words,
the truth and accuracy of Dr. Lawrence's opinions was entirely dependent upon the accuracy
and substantive content of Dr. Bolduc's report."160  The Confrontation Clause, the Court
continued, is only satisfied when the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the person
who made the personal observations, not a different expert. 161 After finding a confrontation
violation, the Court also found that introduction of the evidence was not harmless. 162
VI. JUSTICE THOMAS' VIEW OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Justice Thomas authored a concurrence in Melendez-Diaz. 163 Although short, his opinion
is the controlling opinion because it was necessary to create the decision for the Court. "When
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'"
164
Justice Thomas continued to state his position that there is only a Confrontation Clause
violation if the out-of-court statements were "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 165 Because Melendez-Diaz involved
the admission of certificates stating the results of forensic analysis concerning the weight and
substance and because they were sworn to before a notary public, 166 Justice Thomas found
these certificates to "fall within the core class of testimonial statements" that violate the
Confrontation Clause. 167 Some courts have adopted this interpretation to permit documents,
such as autopsy reports, to be admitted into evidence because they are not "affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 168
In White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas first stated his position that while hearsay and
confrontation were evolving common-law principles, each protected a different interest. 169 The
i
58 id.
159 Id. at 713.
i
60 Id.
161 Id. at 713-14.
I
62 Id. 714-15
163 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
164 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
165 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing his concurring opinion in White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992).
166 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531.
167 Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
168 See Larkin v. Yates, No. CV09-2034-DSF(CT), 2009 WL 2049991, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) (holding
DNA report not testimonial); California v. Thompson, No. C061568, 2010 WL 4493478, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 10, 2010) (holding pathologist's report a government record but not testimonial); California v. Zayas,
No. E048865, 2010 WL 3530426, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010) (holding forensic drug analysis not
testimonial); California v. Hernandez, No. F057090, 2010 WL 3506888, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2010);
California v. Miller, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 629, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug 20, 2010) (holding DNA report not
testimonial); Illinois v. Johnson, 915 N.E.2d 845, 853-54 (III. App. Ct. 2009) (holding DNA report not testimonial
); Maine v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478, 490 (Me. 2010) (autopsy report would not be testimonial under Melendez-
Diaz). But see California v. Lopez-Garcia, No. B215308, 2010 WL 3529775, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
2010) (holding DNA report testimonial); Michigan v. Dendel, No. 247391, 2010 WL 3385552 (Mich. Ct. App.
2010) (holding forensic chemical analysis testimonial); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 955 n.11, 956 n.14 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2009) (holding autopsy and DNA reports testimonial, but were not used in lieu of live expert
testimony).
169 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358-60 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
DANIEL W. EDWARDS
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL ]LAW REVIEW SPRING 2011
16
18
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol1/iss1/6
"right of confrontation evolved as a response to the problem of trial by affidavit." 170 But, Justice
Thomas went on to note, the Confrontation Clause was not intended to encompass hearsay in
general or in totality.171 Drawing the line at what documents were "made in contemplation of
legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of
difficulties" and, ultimately, lead to a merger of the evidentiary hearsay doctrine and the
Confrontation Clause. 172 Justice Thomas found:
One possible formulation is as follows: The federal constitutional right of confrontation
extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. It was
this discrete category of testimonial materials that was historically abused by prosecutors
as a means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefit of the adversary process
[citation omitted by author], and under this approach, the Confrontation Clause would
not be construed to extend beyond the historical evil to which it was directed. 173
Justice Thomas reiterated his position in his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
Davis v. Washington. 174 The Justice criticized the Court's opinion by stating that the Court had
adopted an "unpredictable test, under which district courts are charged with divining the
'primary purpose' of police interrogations." 175 Reaffirming his prior position, Justice Thomas wrote
that a testimonial statement was "necessarily [one that] require[s] some degree of
solemnity...." 176 A primary purpose test, whether statements are made for purposes of later use
at trial or are made in response to an emergency, is rarely present in reality and is not reliably
discernable, making it inevitable that the search for such a purpose is largely "an exercise in
fiction." 177
VII. BUSINESS AND PUBLIC RECORDS
Experts often rely upon various outside information and records in forming opinions.
Justice Scalia in Melendez-Diaz made the distinction between business record and public
records that are not made for use at trial and those that are created specifically for use in the
particular criminal trial.178 As long as the records are made for the carrying on or the
administration of the business or public office, the records meet both the Confrontation Clause
and hearsay requirements.17 9 This analysis requires the person that prepared the document to
testify if the document was made specifically for use at trial.180
To be true to the plain meaning of the Confrontation Clause, even those witnesses who
create a business record or a public record and those witnesses who provide the personal
knowledge that is contained in those records would have to testify. This notion has been
rejected. The Confrontation Clause has become a matter of line drawing. Since this is true,
there must be a rational basis for distinguishing between records made as part of the activities of
the business or agency and those records that are made specifically for litigation.
170 id. at 362 n.1.
171 Id.
1
72 Id. at 364.
1
73 Id. at 365.
174 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I 75 Id.
1
76 Id. at 836.
i
77 Id. at 839.
178 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009).
179 Id. at 2539-40.
180 id. at 2540.
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Business records that meet the hearsay exclusion and are made as part of business
activities are not testimonial. 181 The custodian or other qualified witness (a witness who knows
how the records are made and kept) can testify in court to the foundation for the record. 18 2 The
custodian or other qualified witness is not required to have any personal knowledge about the
underlying facts that are contained in the record. In fact, the records can be self-
authenticating if a certificate is made by the custodian or other qualified witness that establishes
the foundation for the business record. 183 The issue has not been addressed by the courts, but it
would seem under Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that a witness
would be required to come into court to testify to the foundation for the business record and
that introduction of a certificate meeting Fed. Rule Evid. 902(11) would be a violation. The cross-
examination of the custodian or other qualified witness would prove of little assistance to the
defendant because the witness generally has no knowledge of the underlying facts. The
defendant cannot meaningfully cross-examine the custodian or other qualified witness
concerning the underlying facts whose truth, once the business record foundation has been
laid, is assumed. There is simply no rational distinction.
For the same reasons, a public record where a person comes to the trial court to testify
would be admissible if made as an activity of the agency, but the public record could not be
self-authenticating. This requirement simply is not workable nor does it further a criminal
defendant's confrontation rights.
For example, some circuit courts now hold that a public agency's "certificate of
nonexistence of record" (CNR) is insufficient and that the person who prepared the certificate
must appear in court. 184 The cross-examination of the person performing the records search
would prove of little assistance to the defendant. There is no meaningful cross-examination of
the witness who can only testify that a search was made for the record and it does not exist.
There is no rational distinction between the public employee who prepares a certificate of non-
existence and having the certificate admitted at trial and the same public employee appearing
in court for cross-examination.
Other public records have been permitted where cross-examination of a live witness
may have proven beneficial to the defendant. A warrant for removal and documents attesting
to the removal have both been found not to be testimonial because the documents were not
created for future prosecution. 185
isi See, e.g., United States v. Dadaille, 373 F. App'x. 380, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding business record was
neither testimonial nor hearsay and, therefore, not excludable under the confrontation clause); United
States v. Jackson, 635 F.3d 875, 880-82 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding drug dealer's ledgers were testimonial;
however, reversed because ledgers were not properly authenticated and failed to meet hearsay
exception requirements under 803(6)); California v. Suen, No. B208155, 2010 WL 4401796, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 2010) (holding cell tower records are official business records and therefore non-testimonial);
Palacios v. State, No. 02-09-00332-CR, 2010 WL 4570072, at *5 (Tex. App. Nov 4, 2010) (holding hospital
records containing blood alcohol levels were medical records created for treatment purposes and thus
admissible).
182 FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
183 FED. R. EvID. 902(11).
184 See United States v. Scott, 2010 WL 4627876 (11th Cir. 2010) (summary of excerpts of business records
prepared for litigation); United States v. Gonzales, 2010 WL 4342192 (2nd Cir. 2010) (IRS certification that
defendant failed to file tax returns); United States v. Gipson, 2010 WL 2790646 (9th Cir. 2010) (declaration
stating that an FDIC search revealed no record); United States v. Norwood, 595 F.3d 1025, 1029-30 (9th Cir.
2010) (affidavit of absence of any record with Washington Department of Employment); United States v.
Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 584-85 (5th Cir. 2010) (certificate of no record); United States v. Troxler, 2010 WL
3168147 (5th Cir. 2010) (certificate of non-existence of tax returns); United States v. Madarikan, 356 Fed.
App'x 532 (2nd Cir. 2009) (CDR).
185 United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Villaviencio-Burruel, 608 F.3d
556 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Diaz-Gutierrez, 354 Fed. App'x 774 (4 th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (1 1 th Cir. 2005).
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Some courts have made the distinction between whether the business records or public
records were made for this specific prosecution as opposed to records created in general. For
example, certificates of inspection of an intoxilyzer machine 186 and logbooks concerning a
breathalyzer87 were found to be nontestimonial because the acts or facts recorded did not
pertain to this particular prosecution. Other courts, even after Melendez-Diaz, seem to indicate
otherwise, finding that the information is permissible because it is "neutral information."188 In an
alien smuggling case, the introduction of the smuggled aliens 1-213 forms taken from their A-
files" did not violate Crawford-Melendez-Diaz because those records contained "only routine
biographical information" 189
VIII. CONFRONTATION, RULE 402, AND THE RULE 703 BALANCING TEST
In 2000, Fed. Rule Evid. 703 was amended to include the following language:
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect. 190
The balancing test was added to the Rule because circuit courts differed on whether the
underlying basis was admissible and could be disclosed to the jury at all. 191 The Comment to the
amendment indicates that if the underlying basis is admitted a limiting instruction must be given.
The comment went further, stating:
The amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of
information used as the basis of an expert's opinion and not admissible for any
substantive purpose, when that information is offered by the proponent of the
expert. 192
As to how the States have dealt with the issue in their courts, certain states have adopted rules
similar to Rule 703 that resolve the issue by requiring that any underlying basis be proven to the
satisfaction of the factfinder at trial. 193 Other states have adopted the pre-amended Rule 703
without the balancing test 94 or the amended version of Rule 703.195
186 Jackson v. State, No. Al 0A2041, 2010 WL 4609148 (Ga. App. Nov. 16, 2010).
187 Illinois v. Jacobs, No. 4-09-0878, 2010 WL 4366876 (III. App. Nov. 1, 2010).
188 State v. Ducasse, No. Ken-10-159, 2010 WL 4456993 (Me. Nov. 9, 2010) (certificate of compliance by
manufacturer of blood collections kits used in testing blood alcohol levels); State v. Murphy, 991 A.2d 35
(Me. 2010) (certificate issued by Secretary of State concerning driving record and suspension and holding
that testimony would have little practical benefit on cross-examination); State v. Carter, 241 P.3d 1205 (Or.
App. 2010) (warrant based upon failure to appear, holding that the record was not created for purposes of
specific criminal prosecution).
189 United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2010).
190 192 F.R.D. 340, 424 (2000).
191 Id. (Committee notes referring to two contrary circuit cases: United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir.
1988) (permitting evidence that was otherwise inadmissible); United States v. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d
1493 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding error in the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence)).
192 Id. at 425.
193 E.g., MICH. R. EvID. 703 ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference shall be in evidence").
194 ALASKA R. EvID. 703; I.C.A. R. 5.703; LA. CODE EVID. ART. 703; ME. R. EvID. 703; MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-703
(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. 50.285 (1971); N.H. R. EVID. 703; N.J. R. EvID. 703; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-703 (WEST 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.415 (1981); PENN. R. EvID. 703; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-15-3 (2010); TEx. R. EvID. 703; WASH. R. EVID.
703; W. VA. R. EvID. 703.
195 ARIz. R. EvID. 703; COLO. R. EvID. 703; N.D.R. EvID. 703; OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, CH. 40, § 2703 (1978); UTAH R. EvID. 703.
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The Amendment gives rise to the following issues: (1) whether the balancing test is
sufficient to protect a defendant's confrontation rights; (2) whether a limiting instruction is
sufficient to protect a defendant's confrontation rights; and (3) whether the presumption against
admission is sufficient to protect a defendant's confrontation rights.
A. CONFRONTATION AS A RULE 402 ISSUE
Perhaps the wisest course in determining these issues requires us to return to the threshold
relevance inquiry in the evidentiary analysis. Fed. Rule Evid. 402 states that relevant evidence is
admissible "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules. . . ." The language of the rule suggests that once a relevance
determination has been made one question to ask is whether the Constitution permits the use of
such evidence. So that even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if it violates the
Confrontation Clause. If this is true, the issue of the admissibility of the underlying basis of an
expert's opinion must first go through confrontation testing. Under this analysis, Confrontation
Clause issues are considered before the Rules of Evidence. Further, the balancing test would
only apply to evidence that has been found to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause
and inadmissible under the rules of evidence. If the analysis begins at 402 instead of 703, all
three issues are avoided because it is not the Rule of Evidence or the balancing test, but the
Constitution itself that protects the defendant's confrontation rights.
B. CONFRONTATION AS A RULE 703 ISSUE
However, when it comes to the basis of an expert's opinion, courts tend to conduct their
analysis under Rule 703. First, the Confrontation clause issue could be considered in determining
whether the evidence is "otherwise inadmissible." Second, under the balancing test, any
Confrontation Clause issue could be considered in the "prejudicial effect" portion of the
analysis. The appropriate analysis under Rule 703 would be:
Step 1. Is the evidence admissible? This would require subjecting the fact or data to
an analysis through the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause. If the evidence is
admissible and has been or will be admitted into evidence at trial, there would be no
Confrontation issue. However, if the evidence is "otherwise inadmissible," the trial court would
then go to Step 2.
Step 2. If the evidence is inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence, can the evidence
be admitted to test the basis for the expert's opinion or inference? This would require
considerations of the presumption against admissibility, the Confrontation Clause, and the
satisfaction of the balancing test.
The problem with Rule 703 and permitting testimony concerning the underlying basis of
the expert's opinion is that the Rule then becomes an end run around the Rules of Evidence. It
becomes a de facto hearsay exception. If the witness expert testifies that the facts are those
that are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, the factfinder will, just as the expert does,
assume that those underlying facts are true. The "reasonably relied upon" phrase becomes
magic language used by the proponent of the underlying basis of an expert opinion to avoid
Confrontation and the Rules of Evidence.
The jurors' proper function as trier of fact is taken away when the expert assumes facts as
true for purposes of his opinion or inference. There is no ability for the jurors to test the underlying
facts. The facts are admitted because the facts are of a type that are reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field in forming an opinion or inference. This makes the expert the determiner of
what is true. The only possible line of cross-examination is to point out that the opinion relies upon
the basis being true. The expert opinion falls if the expert admits that a sufficient number of the
facts are false, but that depends upon the expert determining whether the underlying basis is
true or false. The cross-examiner is required to ask either a general question, which in itself is not
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very effective, or to ask specific questions concerning each underlying fact, which then
reinforces the fact as being true, whether true or is isnot.
C. LIMITATION ON LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
The efficacy of limiting instructions has long been questioned. 196 "Empirical evidence as
well as common sense suggests that courts greatly exaggerate the efficacy of limiting
instructions." 197 Limiting instructions are not talismans for the solution of any possible prejudice. 198
The possibility that the jury will consider evidence only to its limited purpose is occasionally
overcome by the negative aspects as to be unmanageable from the jurors perspective. 199
The argument can be made that a limiting instruction is sufficient if it advises the
"otherwise inadmissible" evidence can only be considered as it goes to the foundation for the
expert's opinion or inference and cannot be used for the truth of the underlying facts. If the
jurors can actually perform these mental gymnastics, the defendant's confrontation rights are
said to be protected. The question arises whether a reasonable juror can actually separate out
these two separate uses. Whether the use of a limiting instruction when it comes to separating
out the proper and improper use of the evidence can conceivably eliminate the risk of misuse is
an open matter.200 Limiting instructions are a nicety and are perhaps a necessary method of
attempting to prevent jurors from improperly considering this evidence. Empirical research has
found that limiting instructions are generally unsuccessful at controlling how the jurors' perceive
and utilize evidence.201
Limiting instructions are not up to the task that the Rules of Evidence require. It is difficult
if not impossible for jurors to determine what is admissible because it is "reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field in forming their opinions" to be used only for testing the basis of the
expert's opinion and to differentiate that from the assumption that those facts are true.
D. PRESUMPTION AGAINST ADMISSIBILITY
The Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule 703 balancing test state that there is a
presumption against admissibility of the "otherwise inadmissible" basis for an expert's opinion.202
Otherwise inadmissible evidence "shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." 203 This places on
the proponent of the testimony the burden of going forward with evidence sufficient to prove
certain propositions by a preponderance of evidence. First, the trial court is required to
determine the weightiness of that the evidence will have with the jurors only to the extent that it
will help the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion. Second, the court is required to determine the
weightiness of any prejudicial effect. Finally, the court is then to balance those two items to
determine whether the probative value previously determined "substantially" outweighs the
prejudicial effect.
This balancing test will have to be applied by the trial court either before trial or as each
piece of "otherwise inadmissible" evidence is introduced at trial. If not determined pretrial,
196 Lieberman and Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677
(2000).
197 Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory 384 (2001).
198 United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 82 (2nd Cir. 1979).
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., Illinois v. Clay, 884 N.E.2d 214 (III. App. 2008) (concerning the introduction of a prior conviction
and the limiting instruction that the conviction could only be used for credibility).
201 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 195.
202 192 F.R.D. 340, 424-25 (2000).
203 Id.
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each piece of facts or data of "otherwise inadmissible" evidence will require an objection or
motion to strike, a bench conference, a ruling, and a limiting instruction that advises the jury
either to disregard the evidence or to considered the evidence only as it goes to an evaluation
of the expert's opinion and not as substantive evidence.
IX. BASES OF EXPERT OPINION AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Perhaps if the trial court judge does five things, violation of the Confrontation Clause
might be minimized, but it cannot be completely eliminated. First, the trial judge must carefully
scrutinize the underlying basis to determine whether or not the facts and data are admissible.
Second, the trial judge must make sure that the basis meets the Rule 703 requirements when he
has found that the basis consists of some facts or data that are "otherwise inadmissible" to
determine whether those facts are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Third, the trial judge must run the basis through
the gauntlet of the special balancing test. Fourth, the judge must give a limiting instruction
before and after the evidence is offered. Fifth and finally, the trial judge must properly instruct
the jury.
The final instruction to the jury must remind them that the jurors, and not the expert, must
make the determination whether the underlying basis is true or not. The jurors cannot, as seems
natural, assume the truth of the underlying facts and data, but must themselves find the facts to
be true or not. It would not be hard to inform the jurors that the jurors, and not the expert, are
the final arbiters of the truth.
Most current pattern jury instructions are not up to the job. The Federal Pattern Jury
Instructions appear to surrender the truth-finding function of the underlying basis to the expert.
The Federal Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction as pertinent to this issue only provides "[y]ou must
also decide whether his opinions were based on sound reasons, judgment, and information." 204
This pattern instruction requires the juror to dissect the sentence to discover that the expert
opinion was based on "sound . . . information." The First Circuit has a pattern jury instruction
concerning weighing the testimony of an expert that states, in pertinent part:
In weighing the testimony, you should consider the factors that generally bear upon
credibility of a witness as well as the expert witness's education and experience, the
soundness of the reasons given for the opinion, and all other evidence in this case.205
Somewhere in that instruction, the jurors' are required to discern that they are required to be
fact finders concerning the underlying basis of the expert's opinion. The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have similar instructions.206
The Eighth Circuit has an instruction that informs the jurors that they do not have to
accept an expert opinion and that they should "consider the witness's education and
experience, the soundness of the reasons given for the opinion, the acceptability of the
methods used, and all the other evidence in the case." 207 Somehow that instruction is suppose
to inform the jurors that the underlying facts and data are subject to truth finding by the jurors
themselves. The Third Circuit does better by informing the jurors, "in weighing this opinion
testimony you may consider... the reliability of the information supporting the witness'
opinions...."208
204 PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 35 (1987).
205 PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 1STCIR. 2.06 (1998).
206 PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5TH CIR. 1.17 (2001); FED. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7TH CIR. 3.07 (1999); MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 9TH
CIR. 4.14 (2010); PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 10TH CIR. 1.17 (2011).
207 MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 8TH CIR. 4.10 (2007).
208 MOD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3RD CIR. 2.09.
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Some State courts do a much better job in letting the jurors know their specific truth-
finding function. California informs the jurors, in pertinent part:
An opinion is only as good as the facts and reasons on which it is based. If you find that
any fact has not been proved, or has been disproved, you must consider that in
determining the value of the opinion.209
Massachusetts has an alternate instruction concerning expert opinions that provides, in
pertinent part:
It is also entirely up to you to decide whether you accept the facts relied on by the expert
and to decide what conclusions, if any, you draw from the expert's testimony.... You must
also, as has been explained, keep firmly in mind that you alone decide what the facts are.
If you conclude that an expert's opinion is not based on the facts, as you find them to be,
then you may reject the testimony and opinion of the expert in whole or in part . . .. You
must remember that expert witnesses do not decide cases: juries do ... . 2 10
New Jersey carefully instructs jurors that it is the function of the jury, not the expert, "to
determine whether the facts on which the answer or testimony of an expert is based actually
exists." 211
Despite these samples, courts do a very poor job in instructing the jurors about their truth-
finding function overall. The only appropriate way to be sure that a criminal defendant's
confrontation rights are observed is to permit cross-examination of a testifying witness and
advise the jurors of their truth-seeking role concerning the underlying facts and data for an
expert opinion.
X. NOTICE AND DEMAND STATUTES
Notice-and-demand statutes require that the prosecution must first provide notice that
an expert will testify at trial. The defendant after receiving the prosecution's notice must either
assert his confrontation right to have the witness testify at trial or forfeit that right. 212 Citing Taylor
v. IllinoiS213 and Williams v. Florida,214 the Court held in Melendez-Diaz that the defendant can be
required to assert his confrontation rights before trial.215
Justice Scalia thought that defense attorneys would often stipulate to certain expert
testimony.216  He surmised that it would be unlikely that the defense would insist on the
appearance and testimony from witnesses that the defense does not intend to challenge.217 In
a rational and reasonable world this may be true. However, a criminal defendant can
constitutionally insist at trial on proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each and every element,
and a criminal defendant is not required to forego his Confrontation Clause rights for any
reason. In fact in some jurisdictions that have notice-and-demand statutes, defense attorneys
as a matter of course file demands for live testimony from every expert.
The fact that the defendant can be required pre-trial to demand live testimony from an
expert does not entirely resolve the issue concerning the underlying basis for the expert's opinion
209 CAL. JURY INSTR.-CRIM. 2.80 (2010).
210 CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTR. 3.640 (2009).
211 N.J. MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. EXPERT TESTIMONY (2003).
212 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
213 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (upholding sanctions for defendant's failure to provide witness names
and location pre-trial).
214 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding a requirement for pre-trial alibi notice).
2 15 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2541.
2 16 Id. at 2542.
217 Id.
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or inference. Still left to be resolved are those pesky "otherwise inadmissible" facts underlying
the expert's testimony. To solve this problem, the notice-and-demand requirement could be
expanded to include a defendant's notice that the prosecution will be required to prove each
and every underlying fact at trial, either through personal knowledge of the expert or through
some other witness or method of proof.
XI. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
An acute problem arises when the expert becomes unavailable by reason of loss,
change of employment, severe illness or infirmity, death, or another unforeseen circumstance.
To exclude another expert's reliance upon an expert who has become unavailable in one of
these situations would give the defendant an unfair advantage. As the Mattox Court indicated
in 1895 in reference to the Confrontation Clause:
There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any
of these safeguards even by the death of the witness . . . . But general rules of this kind
however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally
give way to consideration of public policy and the necessities of the case .... The law, in
its wisdom, declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that
an incidental benefit may be preserved for the accused.218
A defendant's right to cross-examine and the efficacy of any cross-examination should be
considered in determining what "otherwise inadmissible" evidence should be permitted as the
basis for an expert's opinion.
An actual example of the problem is presented in United States v. Williams, a Federal
District Court case.219 Williams was charged with murder, and one expert conducted the
autopsy.220 However, this expert retired and moved overseas.221 The prosecution filed a motion
in limine to permit the introduction of the autopsy report and death certificate from the
unavailable expert, the introduction of a diagram and photographs taken during the autopsy;
and the testimony of another medical examiner who was not present at the autopsy but who
examined the materials and formed his own opinion about the cause and manner of death.222
Certainly it would be an unjust result if the prosecution was not able to use at least some of this
evidence at trial.
The first possible solution is to adopt a rule in criminal cases that requires that the factual
underlying basis of the expert's opinion be proven. The right to confront would be fulfilled by the
introduction of direct evidence from the testifying expert or from other individuals, expert or not,
that could testify to underlying facts. All witnesses would be subject to cross-examination. This
would be truest to the literal constitutional language. This is the classic and perhaps easiest
solution to the problem. But it also would require more testimony by more witnesses where
expert testimony is involved. In our example, because of the unavailability of the expert who
performed the autopsy, the autopsy report would be inadmissible. Whether the diagram and
the photographs are admissible is a question of establishing the appropriate foundation through
the Rules of Evidence and is not a confrontation issue. Without the pathologist who did the
autopsy, created the diagram, and took the photographs, a satisfactory evidentiary foundation
could not be met. The cause and manner of death could not be proven with this solution. The
cost of this first solution is simply too high.
2 18 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
219 United States v. Williams, 2010 WL 4071538 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010).
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If the first solution is rejected, it becomes a matter of line-drawing. Justice Thomas has
suggested one place to draw that line: in order to be testimonial and require confrontation, the
testimonial statement would have to be "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 2 23 The question, of course, is what the
language means and how those enumerated items would be construed by the courts. This
solution would require the development of case law over a period of time. It would be easy to
state that the autopsy report was not "formalized materials," not an affidavit, not a deposition,
not prior testimony, and certainly not a confession. However, whether the autopsy report would
be considered "formalized testimonial materials" is problematic. Justice Thomas formula would
have to be tested and refined in the trial courts.
The third solution is to draw the line on a hypothetical view of an "objective person" as
Justice Scalia suggests.224 That objective witness would need to find that it was reasonable to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. 22 5 But, a reasonable
witness would never truly believe, after a little rational reflection, that when he has witnessed
something that relates to a criminal offense and makes a statement about it, that any statement
the witness makes would not be used at trial. So the question arises, what statements could be
permitted under Justice Scalia's standard? Justice Scalia's point of view is wrong: it is not the
reasonably objective witness's point of view, but rather whether a reasonable defendant could
benefit from the cross-examination of the witness.
Under Justice Scalia's analysis, in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, a witness must
either testify in court or, if unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. 226 In our example, the hypothetical "objective witness," or the reasonable
pathologist, would know that one of the functions of an autopsy report is for use at a later trial.
Because the witness knows this, the autopsy report could not be admitted at trial, except, under
current practice, as perhaps part of the underlying bases of an opinion or inference by a
testifying expert and even then, it could not be used for substantive purposes.
As a fourth solution, "testimonial" can be refined to exclude certain items but permit
others. First, "testimonial" evidence should exclude items that were not prepared for a specific
prosecution. For example the types of information that might be excluded include certificates
or logbooks of inspection of an intoxylizer227 or certificate of compliance by a manufacturer that
blood collection tubes complied with state requirements. 228
Second, "testimonial" should exclude business records or public records that contain
"neutral information" irrespective of whether the record was made in pursuance of the business
or agency's activities or whether it was prepared for a particular prosecution. While it appears
Justice Scalia would permit the introduction of certain business and public records prepared for
the furtherance of the business or agency and not made for this particular litigation, 229 this
category would be expanded to include certain records that were specifically created for use
in this particular prosecution. For example, courts have permitted the introduction of certificates
from the Secretary of State concerning motor vehicle licenses, records, and suspensions, without
requiring someone from that office to appear and testify in court. 230 Another example would be
evidence of court judgments concerning convictions. A certified copy of the judgment that is
specifically requested by the prosecution and created by a court clerk's office should not be
223 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
224 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532.
2 25 Id. at 2531.
226 Id.
227 Jacobson v. State, 2010 WL 4609148 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2010); Illinois v. Jacobs, 2010 WL 4366876 (III.
App. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010).
228 State v. Ducasse, 8 A.3d 1252 (Me. 2010).
229 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2538.
230 State v. Murphy, 991 A.2d 35 (Me. 2010).
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excluded because a live witness did not testify - although that appears to be the result of the
holding in Melendez-Diaz. However, if the point of view of a reasonable defendant is adopted
and the benefit the defendant might receive through cross-examination is weighed, these
documents, although prepared for this particular prosecution, would be admissible.
Third, "testimonial" should exclude, during an expert's testimony on direct examination,
any evidence that is otherwise inadmissible. However, such evidence should be permitted
during cross examination and, to the extent raised on cross-examination, during redirect
examinations. The defendant, who is under no confrontation requirement, can thus open the
door to the prosecution's use of this otherwise inadmissible evidence.231 This would jettison the
current Fed. Rule Evid. 703 balancing test and its State's corollaries from use in a criminal case.
The matter would be one of the jurors assessing the truth of facts underlying the expert's opinion
or inference. As discussed above, Rule 703 has been used to justify the admission of evidence
that the jury should not receive because it is inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence and
inadmissible as a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
If, however, the admission of the "otherwise inadmissible" basis for expert opinion's
continues, the trial court must ensure to the fullest extent possible that a defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights are observed. This is best performed by utilizing an exacting
evidentiary analysis that requires: (1) the trial court determines whether the facts underlying the
opinion are admissible or inadmissible; (2) the trial court determines whether the inadmissible
facts or data are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming their opinions; (3) the
trial court applies the special balancing test in Rule 703; (4) the judge gives a limiting instruction
before and after the evidence; and (5) the jury is properly instructed as to its role in determining
the truth of the underlying facts or data.
The application of the fourth solution would not permit the admission of the autopsy
report except on cross-examination and re-direct examination to the extent cross opened the
door for such evidence. More specifically, the autopsy report could not be disclosed unless the
defendant was the first proponent of the evidence.
The District Court Judge in the Williams case came up with the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and orders. First, the Judge found that the autopsy report and death
certificate were testimonial. 232 Because the documents were testimonial, the Judge excluded
them from being admitted at trial. 23 3 Further the Judge stated that the prosecution could not
make an end run around Melendez-Diaz by having another expert testify to the contents of the
autopsy report.234 Referencing Fed. Rule Evid. 703, the Court held that the second expert could
testify to his own independent opinion concerning the cause or manner of death, even if this
expert relied on the excluded autopsy report.235 However, the underlying facts or data that
were otherwise inadmissible were not admissible on direct examination.236
XII. CONCLUSION
Courts have permitted "otherwise inadmissible" evidence underlying an expert's opinion
to be presented to the jury both through the Ohio v. RobertS 23 7 "indicia of reliability" and the
Crawford v. Washington 238 "opportunity to cross-examine" analyses. Courts have made the
analyses go both too far and not far enough in protecting a criminal defendant's Confrontation
231 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 733 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that "a defendant
can open the door to admission of evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.').
232 United States v. Williams, 2010 WL 4071538, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010).
233 Id. at *4.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at *5.
237 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
238 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Clause rights. Rule 703 surreptitiously allows jurors to assume inadmissible facts as true. Courts
avoid a Confrontation Clause analysis by using the legal fiction that the evidence is not being
admitted for its truth, but rather as a tool for the jurors to examine the expert's opinion or
inference. Because the Supreme Court has never gone sufficiently far enough to explain the
parameters of the Confrontation Clause, trial and circuit courts are struggling with how that
Clause and expert testimony under the Rules of Evidence fit together. Compounding the
problem is the expansion of fields of expertise and the utilization of expert testimony at trial.
The change in the point of view from an objective witness to a reasonable defendant's
point of view and the measuring of the possible benefit of cross-examination concerning the
particular evidence would improve Confrontation Clause analysis as it relates to experts. Under
this analysis, a certificate of no report or a certified court record would be admissible because
there is little benefit from cross-examining an analyst who searched or certified the records.
Melendez-Diaz requires the exclusion of those records and requires the appearance of a witness.
Under this analysis, certificates of analysts would not be admissible because there is benefit from
cross-examining an analyst to determine whether the results of any testing, whether for drugs,
alcohol, or DNA, were both reliable and verifiable. Melendez-Diaz requires the same result.
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Is TENNESSEE V. GARNER STILL THE LAW?
Eric M. Ziporin and Elliot J. Scott
Since 1985, it would be hard to find any police cadet who did not receive training at the
police academy on Tennessee v. Garner]. Lower courts and commentators consistently
believed that Garner dramatically altered the "use of force" landscape by prohibiting the use of
deadly force on a fleeing suspect unless the suspect posed a significant threat of death or
serious bodily injury to the police or others.
However, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Scott v. Harris significantly
clarified the Fourth Amendment standard for claims of excessive force arising under federal
law.2 Though the case most directly affects police pursuits, Harris also gave lower courts explicit
directions in applying the Fourth Amendment more generally. In Harris, the plaintiff asserted that
the officer's actions in terminating the pursuit with deadly force had to be analyzed under the
standard in Garner.3 Citing Garner, the plaintiff alleged that certain "preconditions" had to be
met before the officer could prevail under the Fourth Amendment: (1) that the suspect must
have posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others; (2) deadly
force must have been necessary to prevent escape; and (3) where feasible, the officer must
have given the suspect some warning.4
The Supreme Court rejected this rigid application of its previous excessive force case law,
and noted that there was no "magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever
an officer's actions constitute deadly force."5 The Supreme Court contrasted Garner with the
facts in Harris noting that the threat posed by an unarmed suspect on foot is not remotely
comparable to the level of danger posed to the public and police officers by a suspect fleeing
recklessly in a vehicle.6
The Supreme Court ruled that, when analyzing an officer's conduct in an excessive force
case arising out of a vehicular pursuit, lower courts must weigh the risk posed by the officer's
conduct against the threat posed by the suspect.7 Thus, the Court considered that the plaintiff
in Harris intentionally placed both himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in a
reckless high-speed chase.8 The Court noted that those who could have been harmed by the
fleeing suspect were innocent, and the suspect had engaged in intentionally criminal conduct.9
With sweeping language, the Supreme Court held that an "officer's attempt to terminate a
dangerous high-speed vehicle pursuit that threatens the lives of the public does not violate the
Fourth Amendment," even when the attempt places the suspect at risk of serious injury or
death. 10
There is good reason to believe that Garner has been all but cast aside as a tool for
analyzing any excessive force case except those with identical facts. In a recent decision by
the federal District Court in Colorado, Chief Judge Edward W. Nottingham noted that it would
be error to assume that Garner remains the law governing the use of deadly force.11 In
Cordova, a lengthy pursuit ended when the driver drove his truck and trailer the wrong way
down an interstate highway at night.12 The officer, who was ahead of the driver attempting to
I Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
2 Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (2007).
3 Id. at 1777.
4 Id.
5 /d.
6 Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)) (citations omitted).
7 Id. at 1778.
8 Id.
9Harris, 127 S.Ct. at 1778.
i0 id.
II Cordova v. Aragon, 560 F.Supp. 2d 1041, 1063 (D. Colo. May 20, 2008).
12 Id. at 1043-48.
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deploy stop sticks, was caught in the roadway with the truck headed in his direction. 13 The
officer fired his weapon at the truck as it approached and passed him, killing the driver with a
bullet that entered the side of the truck.14
The court dismissed the case against the officer by applying Harris. 15 Judge Nottingham
concluded that, regardless of whether the officer was in personal danger when he fired the fatal
shot, the threat the driver posed to innocent motorists and other police officers was so great that
deadly force was warranted. 16 In so ruling, Judge Nottingham noted that in Harris, the Supreme
Court suggested that Garner is "utterly unpersuasive authority" when considering the
reasonableness of the force used in terminating a police pursuit.17
The implications of Harris are therefore far-reaching, not only in the context of police
pursuits, but also in the analysis of deadly force cases generally. Avoiding rigid tests or
preconditions, the Supreme Court has given direction to the lower courts to assess the objective
reasonableness of the use of deadly force under the traditional "totality of the circumstances"
analysis. Equally important, Harris instructs the lower courts to weigh, in the totality of
circumstances, the relative culpability of the parties and the contrasting threat of injury to the
suspect, the officer, and the public. This dramatically diminishes the utility of Garner in analyzing
use of force issues, while reaffirming the essential Fourth Amendment requirement:
reasonableness in light of the situation confronted by the officer.
13 Id. at 1044-46.
14 Id. at 1046.
i
5 /d. at 1051-65.
16 Cordova, 560 F.Supp. 2d at 1058-59.
17 Id. at 1063.
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THE IMPACT OF ARIZONA V. GANT ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
AS APPLIED TO VEHICLE SEARCHES
Michael C. Gizzi and R. Craig Curtis2,3
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 21, 2009, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision that sent
shock waves through the law enforcement community. Arizona v. Gant4 significantly modified
the Supreme Court's rules for vehicle searches incident to arrest-rules that had been in place
since the 1981 decision in New York v. Belton.5 The decision in Gant placed limits on the ability of
the police to conduct searches of a vehicle's passenger compartment after making a
warrantless arrest. The Belton bright-line rule had been extensively used by police, and its demise
was of great concern to the law enforcement community.
Police have used Belton searches in conjunction with arrests for minor traffic offenses as a
key strategy in ferreting out drugs.6 Officers observe a vehicle that they suspect might be
involved in drugs. 7 They might have a hunch, or they may be relying on intelligence about the
vehicle.8 They follow the vehicle and then establish a pretext for pulling it over, often relying on
minor traffic violations.9 When officers pull over a vehicle, they speak with the driver, use their
senses to look for any criminal evidence in plain view, and ask the driver for his license,
registration, and proof of insurance. 10 If the driver is unable to produce any of these three things,
an officer may place him under arrest and may search the vehicle's passenger compartment.'
Although difficult to quantify, law enforcement agents find evidence supporting drug
arrests through this process often enough to create a general perception among officers that
I Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Illinois State University. Ph.D., The University at Albany, State
University of New York (political science). A.B., Saint Michael's College, Vermont.
2 Associate Professor of Political Science, Bradley University. Ph.D., Washington State University (political
science). J.D., McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. A.B., Millsaps College.
3 The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by Maxwell Schneider, Alexeus Bender,
Sarah Nutter, Tyler Wiggs, and Giovanni Circo, criminal justice students at Illinois State University, who
conducted the preliminary content analysis of cases. Kamila Badat, a political science major at Bradley
University, provided assistance reading and commenting on early drafts of the manuscript. An early version
of this paper was presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
Madellyn Haddix provided valuable feedback on the manuscript. This research was partially supported by
Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services Methamphetamine Initiative Grant #
2007CKWX0302. The findings are solely those of the authors, and not the Department of Justice or the
Office of Community Oriented Policing.
4 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
5 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
6 See Markus D. Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2001); Michael C. Gizzi, Pretextual Stops, Vehicle Searches, and Crime Control: An
Examination of Strategies Used on the Frontline of the War on Drugs, in 24 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES: A CRITICAL
JOURNAL OF CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIETY (forthcoming 2011); MILTON HEUMANN & LANCE CASSAK, GOOD Cop, BAD COP:
RACIAL PROFILING AND COMPETING VIEWS OF JUSTICE 70-74 (2003); Walter R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from
Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine," Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843 (2004).
7 HEUMANN & CASSAK, supra note 6, at 73.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 71.
i
0 id. at 71-72.
11 Id. at 72.
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this is a highly effective tactic for drug interdiction. 12 However, the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gant places limits on law enforcement's ability to conduct these searches.
This study examines the issues raised by Arizona v. Gant and provides a context for
understanding the importance of the Gant decision. The article provides an overview of the use
of vehicle searches incident to arrest in the war on drugs and examines the rationale underlying
the Gant decision, considering the implications the case raises for vehicle searches. This
information provides a background for an examination of lower court decisions in the year after
Gant was decided. A content analysis of 125 decisions by federal courts and 117 decisions by
state courts has been conducted to consider the initial impact the decision is having on vehicle
searches. 13
A. VEHICLE SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
In 1969, the Supreme Court decided Chimel v. California and defined the scope of
warrantless searches of individuals that occur incident to arrest.' 4 An officer is permitted to
search the arrestee's person and the area within the "immediate control" of the person, defined
as the distance the individual could reach, in order to discover weapons or to identify evidence
and prevent its concealment or destruction. 15 This rule was expanded by the Court's decision in
United States v. Robinson, which ruled that after a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the
person incident to arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.1 6 Unlike the "stop and
frisk" search authorized by Terry v. Ohio,' 7 the search incident to arrest is a far more invasive
search.18 The search incident to arrest is not limited in the scope of evidence that may be seized
nor in the purpose of the search.19 The only limitation is the "immediate control" standard set out
in Chimel, which means that the entire person of the arrestee is subject to search. 20 While
Chimel's reaching distance rule seemed simple enough, it left some confusion about the
permissible scope of searches incident to legal arrest when the suspect was arrested in a
vehicle.21 Could the search extend to the entire passenger compartment, or was it limited to the
arrestee's reaching distance? In New York v. Belton, the Court set aside the limitations that
Chimel placed on searches incident to arrest by establishing a bright-line rule: when an
individual is arrested in a vehicle, it is reasonable for the officer to search the entire passenger
compartment, including any opened or closed containers. 22
12 See, e.g., Charles Crawford, Race and Pretextual Stops: Noise Enforcement in Midwest City, 6 Soc.
PATHOLOGY 213 (2000); Illya Lichtenberg, Driving While Black (DWB): Examining Race as a Tool in the War on
Drugs, 7 POLICE PRAC. AND RES. 49 (2006); Alberto Lopez, Racial Profiling and Whren: Searching for Objective
Evidence of the Fourth Amendment on the Nation's Roads, 90 KY. L.J. 75 (2001).
13 These cases were selected using Shepard's Citations for Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
"Followed' cases were selected for analysis. In addition, seventy-two federal cases listed in Shepard's as
"Distinguished' were examined. See infra Part IV for a detailed examination of the methodology used.
14 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
15 /d. at 763.
16 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
17 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
is Robinson, 414 U.S. at 228, 234-35.
19 Id. at 234
20 Id. at 235
21 A widely cited analysis of the search incident to arrest rule was highly critical of the rationale in Chimel:
Chimel's justification for a search of that area appears to be based on two assumptions: (1) that the
arrestee might be inclined to reach into that area for a weapon or evidence, and (2) that the
arrestee would be able to reach into that area. The first assumption might be correct, but the second
assumption is not correct. Because it is incorrect, a whole body of subsequent law has been built on a
false foundation.
Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis.
L. REV. 657, 661 (2002).
22 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
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The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement was first stated in the case of
Carroll v. United States in 1925.23 Under that doctrine, a warrantless search of a motor vehicle
was justified when there was probable cause to suspect the presence of contraband in that
vehicle.24 The rationale was that the mobile nature of an automobile made requiring a warrant
impractical.25 The bright-line rule established in Belton enabled an arresting officer to conduct a
search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle for any arrest made in a vehicle. In many
ways, it transformed the automobile exception into a mere probable cause exception: as long
as the officer had probable cause for an arrest, he or she could search the entire passenger
compartment. 26
In 2001, the Court ruled in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista that officers could impose full
custodial arrest for any offense, including minor non-jailable offenses,27 thus expanding the
potential reach of Belton searches and increasing the ability of the police to use traffic
enforcement as a pretext for drug enforcement efforts. In Thornton v. United States, the Court
extended the Belton rule to hold that an arrestee need not even be at the vehicle at the time of
the arrest; the fact that he or she was the "recent occupant" of the vehicle was sufficient to
justify a search of the automobile in question.28 The fact that Thornton was handcuffed and in
the patrol car at the time of the vehicle search would prove to be significant given the facts
and ultimate ruling in Gant.2 9
B. PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOPS AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
New York v. Belton changed the landscape for criminal investigations involving vehicles.
When an officer makes an arrest - any arrest - he can execute a full search of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle.30 The development of search incident to arrest law was particularly
valuable for the "war on drugs." 31 In the 1968 case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court sanctioned
the use of warrantless "stop-and-frisk" searches based only on an officer's "reasonable
articulable suspicion." 32 In response, the federal government began to use criminal profiling
strategies in which profiles of likely drug dealers were developed, and Terry stops were used to
investigate potential drug couriers in the nation's airports and in train and bus stations.33 These
efforts were generally viewed favorably by the Supreme Court. 34 While using a Terry stop was
easy enough when observing suspects disembarking airplanes or buses, it was much more
difficult to develop the required reasonable suspicion when following a vehicle going sixty-five
23 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); see also Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 390, n.49 (2001) (discussing Carroll and opining that the
ongoing efforts to prohibit the sale of alcohol in the 1920s is somewhat similar to the war on drugs that has
resulted in broader powers of search and seizure today).
24 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
2 5 Id. at 153.
26 See Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure, and the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 80, 100 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002).
27 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). The offense in this case was for violation of a mandatory safety belt use law.
28 541 U.S. 615, 622-24 (2004).
29 Commentators have been clear in pointing out flaws of the Thornton ruling. See, e.g., Note, Leading
Case: B. Criminal Low and Procedure, 118 HARV. L. REV. 268, 270-71 (2004), and Jason Hermele, Comment,
Arizona v. Gant: Rethinking the Evidence, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 178-79 (2009), both of which make
prominent favorable mention of Scalia's criticism of Rehnquist's rationale in Thornton.
30 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
31 SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NON-SENSE ABOUT CRIME, DRUGS, AND COMMUNITIES 301-31 (7th ed. 2011)
32 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
33 See Philip S. Greene & Brian W. Wice, The D.E.A. Drug Courier Profile: History and Analysis, 22 S. TEX. L.J. 261,
265-74 (1982).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531 (1985); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 (1980).
MICHAEL GIZZI & R. CRAIG CURTIS 32
34
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol1/iss1/6
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL ILAW REVIEWSPRING 2011
miles per hour down the highway.35 Thus, in 1984, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
came up with a strategy to get around this problem. 36 Under Operation Pipeline, as the DEA's
effort is known, police are encouraged to employ any applicable traffic laws, and if they identify
any traffic infractions, no matter how minor, the officers have probable cause to stop a
vehicle.37 Once the vehicle is stopped, they can observe the driver and passenger using their
senses, request a driver's license and proof of insurance, and determine if any active warrants
have been issued for the vehicle occupants. 38 If an officer has probable cause that the driver
has engaged in any illegal activities, he can place the driver in custody and execute a
complete search of the vehicle's passenger compartment as incident to arrest.39 This has proved
to be a valuable set of tools, and in the past thirty years, the DEA has trained more than 27,000
officers in effectively using these techniques.40
The key to Operation Pipeline is the use of pretextual traffic stops to conduct a drug-related
criminal investigation.41 Officers observe a traffic violation, which they use as the pretext for a
broader investigation.42 Officers can follow a vehicle until they identify a reason to stop the
vehicle, and the reason may be minor.43 Even if the stop is not originally a pretextual stop, the
stop may escalate if the officer becomes suspicious during his interactions with the occupants of
the vehicle.44
Numerous studies have shown that police officers are more likely to stop and search minority
drivers, 45 raising concerns about discrimination through racial profiling. 46 However, in 1996, the
Supreme Court ruled in Whren v. United States that while a traffic stop is a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, "as a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." 47 Whren
provided law enforcement with a definitive statement that the traffic code could be used as the
pretext for criminal investigations as long as the officer had probable cause for the stop.48 The
Whren decision raised questions of racial profiling in the use of vehicle stops, but the Court swept
those questions aside as irrelevant under a Fourth Amendment analysis.49
35 See HEUMANN & CASSAK, supra note 6.
36 See Operations Pipeline and Convoy, UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/pipecon.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011); DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN
INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2001).
37 See Dubber, supra note 6.
38 LaFave, supra note 6, at 1853, 1868.
39 Id. at 1857.
40 VIKAS GUMBHIR, BUT IS IT RACIAL PROFILING: POLICING, PRETEXT STOPS, AND THE COLOR OF SUSPIcIoN 13 (2007).
41 Id. at 14.
42 Id. at 13-14.
43 Id. at 14.
44 Id.
45 See HEUMANN & CASSACK, supra note 6; Craig Curtis, Car Stereos and the Criminal Sanction: The Dangers of
Too Much Social Control, 31 NEW POL. ScI. 273, 285 (2009) (reporting significant racial disparities in
impoundment provisions of vehicle noise ordinances where young male minority drivers were far more likely
to have their vehicles impounded than their prevalence among drivers would suggest); Angela Davis,
Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 432 (1997). See generally Robin Engel & Jennifer
Calnon, Examining the Influence of Drivers' Characteristics During Traffic Stops with Police: Results from a
National Survey, 21 JUST. Q.49 (2004); Robin Engel, A Critique of the "Outcome Test" in Racial Profiling
Research, 25 JUST. Q. 1 (2008).
46 See, e.g., David Harris, Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997); Lopez, supra note 12.
47 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
48 Id.
49 Justice Scalia rejected Whren's argument that the use of "ulterior motives' would invalidate an otherwise
legal traffic stop. Id. at 811. After citing a series of precedents, he was emphatic in proclaiming, " [wie think
these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the
actual motivations of the individual officers involved.' Id. at 813 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
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C. AN EARLY HINT OF THE VULNERABILITYOF BELTON
In the 1998 case of Knowles v. Iowa, the Court ruled that when an officer chooses not to
arrest an individual who commits a minor offense and instead chooses to issue a citation, the
officer does not have the right to conduct a search of the individual.50 The "search incident to
arrest" doctrine does not apply because there is no custodial arrest. In Knowles, the police
stopped a driver for speeding and issued him a citation.5 1 The officer then proceeded to search
the vehicle's passenger compartment, where he found marijuana and drug paraphernalia.52
Iowa law permitted either an arrest or a citation for a traffic violation,53 and the state argued
that this allowed law enforcement to conduct a search incident to issuing a citation. 54 Chief
Justice Rehnquist disagreed. Writing for a unanimous Court, Rehnquist reasoned that when a
search incident to arrest is performed, it has two purposes: a search for weapons and a search
for further evidence of the crime.55 If the law permits an arrest for a citable offense and the
officer chooses not to make the arrest, then there is no rationale for a search beyond officer
safety.5 6 Even if officer safety concerns were present, the search would be limited to the
individual's reachable area.57
The second rationale underlying search incident to arrest is the search for more evidence
related to the crime. The Court stated,
Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary
to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed
was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger
compartment of the car.58
There was no justification for a search to preserve evidence, as all of the evidence needed for
the arrest was already complete; a search incident to arrest in this instance is merely an attempt
to "stumble onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding offense."5 9
Rehnquist's reasoning in Knowles might suggest that the Court would be willing to
reconsider how the search incident to arrest had been contorted by Belton into something that
barely resembled the rationale put forth in United States v. Robinson.60 The application of a
bright line rule as laid out in Belton could easily result in the police engaging in full blown
searches of cars stopped for a wide range of minor traffic violations. Often, the Court issues
significant rulings when extreme factual situations emerge from the application of existing
doctrines. For example, it was only three years later that the Court decided Atwater, permitting
full custodial arrests for any offense, including those misdemeanors and petty offenses that were
218 (1973); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Villamonte Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
(1983)). While he acknowledged that the Constitution prohibits 'selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race,' he asserted, 'the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 814
nn.6-7.
so 525 U.S. 113, 117-19 (1998).
51 Id. at 114.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 115.
5s Id. at 116 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)).




60 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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not punishable by jail.61 This further widened the ability of police to use vehicle searches to wage
the war on drugs but also exposed the extremes to which police misconduct could be justified
by existing search and seizure rules. Indeed, one of the telling features of the Gant decision is the
total lack of any sense that the law places any restraints on them by the police at the scene.
II. ARIZONA V. GANT: AN UNEXPECTED SHIFT IN SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST LAW
The facts in the case of Arizona v. Gant are not complex. The police in Tucson, Arizona
received an anonymous tip that a residence was involved in the illegal drug trade. 62 Knowing
that an anonymous tip alone is insufficient to detain a suspect,63 the police focused their
investigation on the residence.64 They knocked on the door and spoke to Rodney Gant, who
answered the door and identified himself, but claimed that he was not a resident of the house.65
The officers withdrew, ran a background check on Gant, discovered that he had a suspended
driver's license, and returned to the residence. 66 Gant was not there, but he drove back to the
residence while the officers were present.67 Having observed Gant driving and knowing that he
had a suspended driver's license, the officers placed him under arrest, handcuffed him, and
placed him in the back of a police cruiser.68 An officer then proceeded to search Gant's car,
finding a gun and cocaine.69
At trial, Gant moved to suppress the evidence of the gun and the cocaine on the basis
that the police had no probable cause to search for evidence of drug trafficking and that a
search of the car incident to arrest was not proper since he was completely and securely
isolated from the car at the time of his arrest. 70 The trial court ruled for the state71 but was
reversed by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 72 which determined that the search incident to arrest
was not permissible under Belton because "the record before us does not support a finding that
the police were attempting to initiate contact with Gant while he was in the vehicle." 73 After the
Arizona Supreme Court declined to hear the case, the State sought certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court, which was granted in 2003.74 The Supreme Court did not reach the merits,
however, and remanded the case75 back to the state courts for reconsideration in light of a
2003 Arizona Supreme Court case, State v. Dean. 76 The trial court refused to suppress the
evidence as an unreasonable search and seizure, and Gant appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which again reversed the decision.77 The Court of Appeals held that the suppression was
appropriate because Gant had no means of gaining access to the car at the time of the search
and noted that since Gant was in handcuffs, neither of the rationales for search incident to
61 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
62 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710,1714 (2009).
63 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
64 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714.
65 d. at 1714-15.





71 Def's. Mot. to Supp., State v. Gant, No. CR-2000-0042, 2000 WL 34566317 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2000).
72 State v. Gant, 43 P.3d 188, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
73 Id. at 194.
74 Arizona v. Gant, 538 U.S. 976 (2003).
75 Arizona v. Gant, 540 U.S. 963 (2003).
76 76 P.3d 429, 436-37 (Ariz. 2003) (holding that a search incident to arrest was invalid where the arrestee
was not the "recent occupant' of a vehicle, and criticizing the earlier ruling in State v. Gant, 43 P.3d 188).
77 State v. Gant, No. CR-230000042, 2004 WL 5588539, at *1 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2004).
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arrest was present. 8 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. 9 Once again, the case made its way
to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in February 2008 on the question:
[whether the Fourth Amendment requires] law enforcement officers to demonstrate a
threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest in order
to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's
recent occupants have been arrested and secured.80
Arizona v. Gant was argued on October 7, 2008.81 Oral argument largely turned on the
question of whether the two-pronged justification for search incident to arrest could support the
bright-line rule established twenty-seven years earlier in New York v. Belton.82 Thirty-three states
submitted amicus briefs in support of the state,83 and several Justices, including Scalia, Stevens,
Ginsberg, and Souter, expressed disbelief that the officer safety rationale made sense as the
justification for Belton, particularly given the facts involved in Gant.84 Justices Breyer, Alito, and
Chief Justice Roberts were the only justices to actively engage the respondent and make the
case for continuing Belton's bright-line rule.85
The decision that the Court handed down in April 2009 reflected the Justices' positions
revealed during oral argument. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined in
a 5-4 decision by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Thomas, 86 with Justice Scalia writing a separate
concurrence.87 Justice Breyer wrote a dissent,88 and Justice Alito wrote a dissent in which Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts joined, and Justice Breyer joined in part.89
Justice Stevens was the only justice remaining from the Court that decided New York v.
Belton, and his opinion in Gant is hinted at in his dissent in Thornton v. United States, in which he
questioned the rationale of Belton.90 Stevens viewed Belton as being "swollen" beyond its
original intent when it was used to allow an officer to search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle in which the arrestee had been merely a "recent occupant." 91 He accepted the use of
the automobile exception if there was probable cause to search, but was troubled by the way
that Belton had been contorted into a generally applicable tool for police to search a vehicle's
passenger compartment without consideration for the legal basis for that search.92
78 State v. Gant, 143 P.3d 379, 382-83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
79 State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 646 (Ariz. 2007).
80 Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230, 1230 (2008).
81 Transcript of Oral Argument, Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (No. 07-542), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/07-542.pdf.
82 Id.
83 Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2003)
(No. 02-1019), 2003 WL 21648701; Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2003) (No. 07-542), 2008 WL 2151707.
84 Transcript of Oral Argument, Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542).
85 Id. at 39-45.
86 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1710 (2009).
87 Id. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 1725-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 1726-32 (Alito, J., dissenting).
90 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 633-36 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 636.
92 Id.; see also, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 599 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" Even
accepting Belton's application to a case like this one, however, the Court's logic extends its holding to a
container placed in the trunk of a vehicle, rather than in the passenger compartment. And the Court
makes this extension without any justification whatsoever other than convenience to law enforcement.);
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 313 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('Instead of applying ordinary Fourth
Amendment principles to this case, the majority extends the automobile warrant exception to allow
searches of passenger belongings based on the driver's misconduct. Thankfully, the Court's automobile-
centered analysis limits the scope of its holding. But it does not justify the outcome in this case.").
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Stevens began the Court's decision in Gant by confronting the shortcomings of returning
to the original rationales for search incident to arrest. He argued that the primary purpose of the
search was for officer safety and to ensure that the arrestee could not gain access to
weapons.93 The "reaching-distance" rule of Chimel as applied to vehicles did not support the
search of Gant's vehicle after he had been handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the
patrol car.94 Moreover, the second rationale for searches incident to arrest also did not apply, as
a search for evidence related to the crime could only be used when it was reasonable to
assume that evidence supporting the arrest might be found in the vehicle.95 Given that Gant
was arrested for driving under a suspended license, this was not reasonable. 96
Belton had been expanded in such a way that it was disconnected from its original
rationale. Stevens quoted Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thornton, in which she stated,
"lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of
a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin
rationales of Chimel." 97 Even the officer who searched Gant's vehicle noted that he conducted
the search "because the law says we can do it."98 The bright-line rule in Belton was designed to
provide officers with maximum efficiency in conducting their work, yet it did so by disregarding
the constitutional rationale for the search in the first place.99 Stevens challenged the Thornton
holding that allowed police to search the vehicle recently occupied by an arrestee, even
though "most of the time the vehicle would not be within the arrestee's reach at the time of the
search." 100 He rejected the broad reading of Belton, and held that Chimel v. California provides
the proper standard for vehicle searches incident to arrest. 101 The Chimel rationale "authorizes
police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search." 102
In order to gain the crucial fifth vote for a majority, Stevens acceded to Justice Scalia's
desire to allow a search of a vehicle under the circumstances when "it is reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle." 10 3 This would not permit
a search in cases like Gant's where the arrest was for a minor traffic violation, but it would have
supported the searches in Belton and in Thornton where the initial arrests were drug-related; thus,
it would be reasonable for officers to conclude that further evidence of that crime might be
found in the passenger compartment.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia rejected Stevens' reliance on Chimel and argued
that the only rationale for a vehicle search incident to arrest is where it is reasonable to believe
evidence related to the crime of arrest would be found. 104 Scalia believed that the officer safety
rule left too much room for manipulation by officers. 105 Yet, because no other member of the
Court shared his view about Chimel, Scalia chose to join the majority in order to avoid what he
93 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
94 Id. at 1719.
95 Id.
96 Id. ("Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a
suspended license-an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger
compartment of Gant's car.').
97 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part)).
98 Id. at 1715.
99 Id. at 1723 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
i00 id. at 1719.
ioi Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
1
04 Id. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
i
05 id.
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viewed as "plainly unconstitutional searches" under the Belton standard. 106 While the two
pronged ruling that emerged - permitting searches of the defendant's "reaching distance"
when not secured or full passenger compartment searches when it is reasonable to believe that
the search will yield further evidence of the crime of arrest - is more accommodating to police
than Stevens' sole opinion would have been, the Stevens/Scalia rationale places significant limits
on the police to conduct vehicle searches incident to a legal arrest.
Writing in dissent, Justice Alito argued that the majority had in fact overruled Belton even
though it claimed only to be modifying it.107 Alito challenged the majority for abandoning stare
decisis in an area of the law in which there has been substantial reliance by law enforcement on
the rule set forth in Belton, stating, " [t]he Belton rule has been taught to police officers for more
than a quarter century."108 This was also the stated rationale for Justice Breyer's dissent, in which
he acknowledged Stevens' concerns about the problems of unconstitutional searches but
believed that great weight had to be given to the Belton precedent that had been recently
reaffirmed in Thornton and had been relied on for the past twenty-eight years. 109
Alito further argued that Belton has been a workable rule, and there have been no
circumstances that have occurred which would bring the decision's rationale into question. 110
He challenged the Court's claim that the reasoning in Belton was flawed, arguing that the
reliance on Chimel is flawed, and that the Belton Court could not have assumed that the search
would occur before the arrestee was placed in custody.111 It was enough for Alito that at the
time of the arrest the suspect was near their vehicle, the suspect would then be secured, and
the search could proceed safely.112 Alito also questioned Justice Scalia's "reasonable to
believe" standard, wondering why a "reasonableness" standard would be used, rather than a
probable cause standard.1 13
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GANT FOR THE FUTURE OF VEHICLE SEARCHES
Arizona v. Gant could fundamentally reshape the law of search incident to arrest. The
bright-line rule from New York v. Belton seems to have been abandoned. Officers may no longer
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest unless they have reason to
believe that the arrestee will be able to gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.1 14
In that instance, the "reachable-distance" rule of Chimel v. California determines the scope of a
permissible search.15 A search can also be conducted if the officer has reasonable belief that
the vehicle contains further evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested. 116 For
arrests stemming from minor traffic violations, this precludes a vehicle search.117 The reaction
from the law enforcement community, at least as evidenced by such publications as the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin" 8 and Police Chief, 119 suggests that Gant is perceived as a significant ruling
for day-to-day law enforcement operations.
i
06 Id. at 1725.
107 Id. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting).
i08 /d. at 1728 (Alito, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1725-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
i10 id. at 1729 (Alito, J., dissenting).
'I Id. at 1730-31.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1731.
114 Id. at 1723-24.
i15 /d. at 1723.
16 Id.
i17 Id. at 1719.
118 Richard G. Schott, The Supreme Court Reexamines Search Incident to Lawful Arrest, 78 FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin 22 (2009).
119 Lisa A. Judge, Bye-Bye Belton? Supreme Court Decision Shifts Authority for Vehicle Searches from
Automatic to Manual, POLICE CHIEF MAG., June 6, 2009, available at
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For twenty-eight years, the bright-line rule from Belton governed searches incident to
arrest occurring in the context of a traffic stop. In many ways, Justice O'Connor's comments in
Thornton were accurate in that police have viewed the tool of search incident to arrest as an
entitlement. Pretextual stops were an essential tool in the war on drugs and in many other types
of criminal investigations. Police officers knew that all they had to do was to establish probable
cause for an illegal act based on whatever information they had. They could then stop a
suspect's vehicle on the pretext of a minor traffic offense, place the driver under arrest, and
proceed to conduct a complete search of the passenger compartment. Thus, the decision in
Gant represents what could be a paradigm shift for law enforcement, at least with regard to
automobile searches.
A few months after the Gant decision, both the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 20 and
Police Chiefl21 had articles focusing on the implications of the decision. The Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center issued a ten-page report on the decision to educate law
enforcement officers on how the decision changed protocol in the context of investigatory
traffic stops.122 Perhaps more importantly, the article provided a list of five vehicle search
exceptions that officers can use in specific circumstances and still comply with the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment. 123 First, if there is reasonable suspicion that a passenger or recent
occupant is dangerous and might be able to gain access to the vehicle, the officer can "frisk
the passenger compartment for weapons."1 24 This suggests that the search would be permissible
even if the driver is secured and under arrest if other recent occupants are not under the control
of the officer. Second, an officer may search a vehicle if he has reasonable belief that "the
vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." 125 Such a search is implied by Justice Scalia's
reasonable belief standard of finding evidence of criminal activity related to the arresting
offense. Third, an officer can conduct a protective sweep of a vehicle if he or she has
reasonable suspicion that a dangerous person is hiding therein. 126 This search would be limited to
looking in places where such a person might be hiding, but it would not allow a full search of all
containers in the vehicle. 127 Fourth, the officer can search the vehicle if he or she gains consent
to do so. 12 8 Finally, if the officer chooses to lawfully impound the vehicle after an arrest, this
would enable an inventory search for administrative purposes; if performed legally, an inventory
search would permit any contraband to be seized. 129 These same "tips" were reproduced in the
June 2009 issue of Police Chief.130
Of these exceptions, consent and inventory searches are particularly important. Many
police officers believe they can convince almost anyone to consent to a search; thus, it is a
logical implication of Gant that officers will seek to obtain consent to search in cases in which
they could previously conduct a search incident to arrest. As long as consent is given voluntarily,
the Court has held that a consent search is legal.131 Consent for a search does not require the
officer to arrest the individual.132 For example, when someone is issued a summons for failure to
http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print-display&articleid=1811 &issueid=6
2009.
120 Schott, supra note 118.
121 Judge, supra note 119.
122 Jennifer G. Solari, The United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Arizona v. Gant: Implications for Low
Enforcement Officers, FED. LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMER, May 2009, at 3, 3-8.







130 See Judge, supra note 119.
131 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
132 Id. at 277.
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show proof of insurance, the police officer could simply ask the driver to consent to a search of
the vehicle. However, if for the same offense the officer placed the driver under arrest and then
asked the arrestee to search the vehicle as a condition of releasing him, a court would likely
interpret this behavior as coercive, thus invalidating the voluntariness of consent.
The last search exception discussed in the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
report is the inventory search.133 An inventory search is an administrative search conducted
when a vehicle has been lawfully impounded. 134 The purpose of this type of search is to
inventory the contents of a vehicle and protect the police from claims that valuable items in the
vehicle were stolen when it was in the impound system. 135 If in the course of inventorying a
vehicle, the police discover illegal contraband or evidence of a crime, that evidence is
admissible in court.136 As the report suggests, if the law permits the use of impoundment, this may
be a way to accomplish a full vehicle search.137 It is unclear how the Court would respond to this
back-door method to circumvent Gant's restrictions, but the Court has been willing to limit the
scope of inventory searches in the past. 13 8 As Chief Justice Rehnquist said in his majority opinion
affirming the suppression of evidence in Florida v. Wells, " [o] ur view that standardized criteria ...
must regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches is based on the
principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence." 139 Thus, if an agency has a standing policy to impound any
vehicle where an arrest occurs on the street, then it is likely that this exception would be
acceptable. But if an agency rarely or never impounds vehicles as a matter of practice, then
the shift to impoundment in light of Gant might be viewed as an attempt to violate the spirit of
the decision.
IV. THE JUDICIAL IMPACT OF ARIZONA V. GANT
The impact of the Gant decision on law enforcement search practices will only become
clear once time has passed for lower courts to flesh out their interpretations of the decision.
Additionally, it will take time for law enforcement to adapt their practices to the new rules. While
any examination of the impact of Arizona v. Gant after one year is by its very nature preliminary,
there are important indicators present that suggest that the Court's decision is significant.
A. RESEARCH METHOD
In order to consider the impact of the Gant decision, every lower federal court decision
citing Gant in Shepard's Citations from April 22, 2009, through September 30, 2010, was read and
analyzed. The decisions were read and coded to present a quantitative picture of the issues
that have been raised in the year following the ruling and to examine the substantive impact of
the decision in terms of the resolution of cases. Shepard's was used as the primary means of
identifying lower court decisions responding to the Gant decision because it is the most
comprehensive data source available to identify court decision citations to pre-existing cases. 140
133 Solari, supra note 122, at 8.
134 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1988); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1976).
135 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.
136 Opperman, 428 U.S. at 371-73.
1
37 Solari, supra note 122, at 8.
138 See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4.
139 Id. (emphasis added).
140 THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS, ||, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 45-50 (Princeton
Univ. Press 2008) (2006) (finding that LEXIS Shepard's Citations is a reliable and valid tool for judicial impact
studies).
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For the analysis conducted here, all cases that were listed by Shepard's as "followed by"
federal courts or state courts were examined. In addition, the seventy-two Federal cases that
were listed as "distinguished by" in Shepard's were examined separately. Cases that only cited
Gant, and provided no analysis, were excluded. Tables 1 and 2 provide a detailed breakdown
for the courts that rendered these decisions.
Content analysis was conducted after reading each decision. Cases were coded for
whether the state or defendant won in the ruling, the presence of inventory searches, consent
searches, the reason for the arrest, and the rationale for the decision. For the reason for the
arrest, cases were coded as either minor traffic violation, driving with suspended license, drug
arrest, warrant, possession of firearm, and other. The rationale for the decision was coded under
the two prongs of the Gant ruling, including cases in which there was no justification for a search
(e.g., minor traffic offenses, driving under a suspended/revoked license, warrants for failure to
appear for minor offenses) and cases where a search was justified by a reasonable search for
further evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made. These included drug arrests, officer
safety claims based on the presence of firearms or weapons, and other reasons where courts
believed it reasonable for further evidence to be found through a search. In addition, cases
were coded if they were justified by the automobile exception, valid consent search, or a good
faith exception to Gant.
B. RESULTS
Shepard's Citations reports that in the eighteen months since Gant was decided, the
case has been cited by 814 lower federal and state courts. The number of cases making
reference to Gant has increased by approximately forty cases each month. Of the cases in
which Shepard's indicated there was "analysis", 242 cases have followed the decision, 138 have
distinguished it, and three have criticized it.141 The sheer number of citations to Gant in such a
short time period is significant. A separate analysis of citations to Supreme Court search and
seizure cases since 1953 shows that Gant is ranked forty-second among all search and seizure
cases in terms of the number of citations by lower courts. 14 2
141 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (available at LEXIS, Shepardize, original search and shepardization of
cases citing completed Oct. 22, 2010).
142 The author shepardized all 298 search and seizure opinions found in the Supreme Court database and
ranked these decisions by total number of lower court citations. As of Sept. 2010, Gant ranks among the
top fifteen percent of all search and seizure cases decided since 1953. Michael C. Gizzi, William R.
Wilkerson, and R. Craig Curtis, What Makes a Landmark Case or Major Opinion? Examining Citation Patterns
in Search and Seizure Cases (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with author).
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Table 1. Followed and Distinguished Cases in Federal Court




Court of District Court of District
Circuit
Appeals Court Appeals Court
0 1 0 0
2 0 7 0 2
3 2 9 0 3
4 4 8 3 12
5 0 5 2 4
6 4 21 2 9
7 0 8 2 5
8 6 18 0 8
9 9 10 1 9
10 1 3 0 3
11 1 6 1 6
DC 2 0 0 0
Total 29 96 11 61
143 SOURCE: Shepard's Citations, compiled by the authors.
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Table 2. Followed Decisions in State Courts
April 22, 2009 - September 30, 2010144
T Lower Supreme Total
Court Court
California 1 0 1
Colorado 1 2 3
District of
Columbia
Florida 4 0 4
Georgia 3 0 3
Idaho 2 1 3
Illinois 3 1 4
Indiana 3 0 3
Kansas 5 1 6
Kentucky 3 2 5
Louisiana 3 1 4
Maryland 1 0 1
Michigan 2 0 2
Missouri 3 0 3
North
Carolina
New York 3 0 3






Utah 2 1 3
Virginia 5 0 5
Washington 25 4 29
Wisconsin 3 1 4
Total 103 14 117
144 SOURCE: Shepard's Citations, compiled by the authors.
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1. Federal Court Decisions
Of the 125 "followed by" cases in Federal Court, the defendant had a positive result
(defined as either having a search suppressed or a ruling favorable to their position) in 29.6
percent of the cases (n=37). Seventeen cases involved instances where the defendant was
arrested for driving without a license or with a suspended license. For example, in one Fourth
Circuit case,
[the defendant] was handcuffed and secured in the patrol car when Officer Czernicki
searched the Cadillac and found the drugs. Thus, the Cadillac's passenger compartment
was not "within [the defendant's] reach at the time of the search." Moreover, the officer
would not have had a reasonable basis to believe he would find evidence of [the
defendant's] license suspension - the offense of arrest - within the Cadillac's passenger
compartment.145
One case had evidence suppressed because the initial arrest was for reckless driving. 146 There
were another six cases where the court found no reasonable basis for a search for evidence of
the crime of arrest, including a minor warrant, 147 and one case where the suspect was arrested
on a warrant for domestic abuse.148
One search was invalidated because the arrest was for resisting arrest and battery
upon a peace officer.149 The court argued that,
[iun this case, neither the officer safety nor the evidentiary preservation justifications for a
search incident to arrest supports the search of [the defendant's] car. At the time of the
search, [the] defendant ... had fled from the car, eluded police offices, and jumped over
a fence. He was nowhere near the car after he fled the scene and jumped the fence ....
[E]ven if [the defendant] had returned to the vicinity of the car, he would not have had
access to the backpack or the gun as it was under [another person's] 'dominion and
control.' Moreover, akin to traffic-related offenses, it is generally unlikely that an officer
could reasonably expect to find evidence of the crimes of battery upon an officer or
resisting arrest within a car.150
In two cases, the defendant won because courts found that an invalid inventory search
was conducted by officers, who failed to follow the Supreme Court's requirements that
agencies employing inventory searches have standardized procedures. 15 1 For example, in one
case it was argued,
[i]t was never established that the Spink County training of its law enforcement officers
suggested or required that their standard practice should be to open any closed
containers as a part of an inventory search. There was no standardized procedure in this
regard in Spink County and the written policy does not state that closed containers should
be opened during the inventory search. 152
145 United States v. Majette, 326 F. App'x 211, 212-13 (4th Cir. 2009).
146 United States v. Lopez, 567 F.3d 755, 756 (6th Cir. 2009).
147 United States v. Westerman, No. 1:09-cr-8-WSD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123601, at *3-5 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2009)
(finding no basis for a search incident to arrest when the defendant was stopped for a minor traffic
infraction and was subsequently arrested based on an outstanding warrant for probation violation).
148 United States v. Megginson, 340 Fed. App'x 856, 857 (4th Cir. 2009).
149 United States v. Chavez, No. 2:09-cr-0033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116924, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009).
150 id.
151 United States v. Jackson, No. 1:07-CR-016, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1699, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2010); United
States v. Sullivan, No. CR 09-40043, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59934, at *1-3 (D.S.D. July 13, 2009).
152 Sullivan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59934, at *1.
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In one case, questioning done as part of an inventory search was ruled to be a violation of the
defendant's Miranda rights:
Although a question concerning the possession of "valuables' may have been proper for
inventory purposes, the trooper should have known that inquiring about a 'large amount
of U.S. currency and/or guns' was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
a suspect... 153
Finally, in two cases, courts allowed plea agreements that were made prior to the Gant decision
to be revoked so questions of invalid searches could be considered. 154
The government won in eighty-three cases where Gant was followed. Here there were
several interesting findings. Almost half of the cases involved arrests for drug offenses. In twenty
cases, the defendant was arrested for drug-related offenses, and vehicle searches were justified
by the "reasonable evidence of the crime" prong under Gant. For example, in the case of
United States v. Bell, the court found,
[t]he police could reasonably believe that evidence of Bell's drug offense was in the car.
Bell had apparently sold the drugs inside the car, and had driven the car to and from the
sale site. Under Gant's second prong, the authority to search extends to containers in the
passenger compartment if the police reasonably believe that evidence of the suspected
crime may be found therein.155
Two cases involved drug paraphernalia or illegal weapons found during the search of the
person incident to arrest, which justified the search of the vehicle. 15 6 Eight cases were won by
the state where the officer obtained consent for a search, and the courts ruled that consent was
properly obtained. 157
Eighteen cases involved application of the automobile exception due to the existence
of probable cause that contraband was in the car.15 8 For example, in a case where the suspect
was arrested for possession of illegal firearms, the district court ruled that "because the officers
had probable cause to believe that [the defendant's] car contained evidence of crimes, the
well-recognized automobile exception to the warrant requirement alleviates any Fourth
Amendment concerns." 15 9 In another automobile exception case, the district court used the
automobile exception to make the argument,
[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, including the officers' prior knowledge of
Defendant, the presence of numerous air fresheners, Defendant's unusual behavior, and
[the drug dog's] positive alert, the Court concludes that probable cause existed to search
Defendant's vehicle for evidence of narcotics possession and/or trafficking. 60
In this case, the defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. 16 1
153 United States v. Vega, No. C-09-064, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49614, at *13 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2009).
154 United States v. Amos, No. 3:08-CR-145, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 515, at *21 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2010); United
States v. Avendano, 373 Fed. App'x 683 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010).
155 343 Fed. App'x 72, 74 (6th Cir. 2009).
156 See United States v. Hunter, 333 Fed. App'x 920, 925-26 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Garibay, 334 Fed.
App'x 91, 93 (9th Cir. 2009).
157 See id.
158 Another 12 automobile exception cases were included among the 72 federal cases that Shepard's
identified as "distinguishing."
159 United States v. Cowart, No. 1:08-cr-101 19, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49366, at *38 (W.D. Tenn. June 5, 2009).
160 United States v. Toliver, No. 09-20503, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6442, at *11-12 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2010).
161 Id. at *2.
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Two circuits established a "good faith" exception for cases in which the searches
occurred before the decision in Gant was handed down. In United States v. McCane, 162 the
Tenth Circuit used the precedent of United States v. Leonl63 to establish a good faith exception
for Belton searches conducted before the ruling in Gant. The Eleventh Circuit established a
good faith exception in March 2010 in United States v. Mitchell.164 In the months immediately
following the Gant decision, the Eighth Circuit refused to consider a good faith exception, 165 but
in December 2009, an Eighth Circuit District Court in Nebraska used the good faith exception to
uphold a search.166 The Tenth Circuit decision in McCane has created a circuit conflict with the
Ninth Circuit, which rejected a good faith exception claim in United States v. Gonzalez. 167 In
United States v. Casper, the Fifth Circuit remanded a case to the District Court for an evidentiary
hearing on inevitable discovery, but did not rule on the government's claim of a good faith
exception. 168 One District Court in the Fourth Circuit used a good faith exception to invalidate a
pro-defendant ruling 169 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on the issue of good
faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule in cases where searches were authorized by precedent
at the time of the search, but later invalidated. 170
Finally, there were twenty-five cases the government won that raised issues involving
inventory searches. There were two cases where courts ruled that inventory searches were
invalid for failure of the agency to demonstrate routine practice or policy. 171 There were an
additional three cases where an invalid inventory search was not viewed as sufficient to
suppress evidence, due to outside factors including exigent circumstances involving concerns
for officer safety during transportation of property, the use of the automobile exception, and
consent provided for a search. 172 In examining inventory search cases, the record only indicated
one case where a magistrate-judge actually reviewed department policies to make the
determination of whether officers were entitled to impound vehicles and conduct inventory
searches. 173 There were also cases where it was unclear from the record whether an inventory
search occurred, but where the court accepted an "inevitable discovery" argument. For
example, the Seventh Circuit stated,
[O]bviously, the arresting officers would not have allowed the truck to just sit on the street
after [the driver] was carted away. What they would have done, in all likelihood, was
impound the truck and have it towed away. An inventory search would have naturally
followed; the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. 174
2. STATE COURT DECISIONS
162 573 F.3d 1037, 1042 (2009).
163 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984).
164 374 Fed. App'x 859, 867 (11th Cir. 2010).
165 United States v Hrasky, 567 F.3d 367, 369 (11th Cir. 2009).
166 United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113436, at *15-16 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009).
167 578 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir.2009).
168 332 Fed. App'x 222, 223 (5th Cir. 2009).
169 United States v. Southerland, No. 7:09-CR-68-1 FL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119851, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 13,
2009).
170 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (oral argument scheduled for March 21, 2011).
171 United States v. Jackson, No. 1:07-CR-016, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1699, at *7, 11 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2010);
United States v. Sullivan, No. CR 09-40043, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59934, at *1-2 (D.S.D. July 13, 2009).
172 United States v. Morillo, No. 08 CR 676 (NGG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396, at *21-23 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009);
United States v. Mitan, No. 08-760-1/08-760-2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63890, at *39-40 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2009);
United States v. Scott, No. 09 CR 331 (HB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52431, at *28-34 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009).
173 United States v Sprecht, No. 8:09CR101, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99759, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 26, 2009).
174 United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010).
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There have been 117 cases in which Gant was followed by state courts. Nine state
supreme courts have handed down fourteen decisions that involved Gant issues in the past
year. There were 103 lower court decisions in twenty-five state courts. Unlike federal court, where
defendants won in 29 percent of cases, in state courts, defendants won in 56.4 percent (n = 66)
of all cases. 175 While cases have been decided in twenty-five states, almost 40 percent of
existing decisions were from three states: Washington (n=29), Ohio (n=12), and Texas (n= 11). The
defendant won in 21 of 29 (72.4 percent) cases in Washington, 50 percent in Ohio, and 36
percent of cases in Texas. Yet, even with those cases removed from the database, the
defendant won in 51 percent of all other state court decisions.
State supreme court rulings in nine states ruled for the defendant in 11 of 14 cases (78.5
percent). Perhaps the most interesting of the decisions by state supreme courts is State v.
Henning, in which the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the state's search incident to arrest law
was unconstitutional under Gant.1 76 Two state supreme courts have considered good faith
exceptions for Gant cases. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected a good faith exception.177 The
Utah Supreme Court established a good faith exception in State v. Baker, but excluded
evidence of the vehicle search for other reasons. 178 The Court ruled that a vehicle search that
would be unconstitutional under Gant was protected by good faith exception of Leon, but
because the officers lacked "reasonable articulable suspicion that the passengers posed a
threat to their safety at the time they conducted the pat-down search," the evidence was
suppressed. 179 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also considered a good faith exception
for Gant cases, but rejected it.180 The Illinois and Washington Supreme Courts handed down
decisions favorable to the defendant under Gant.181 The Delaware and Kentucky Supreme
Courts have decided Gant cases favorable to the state: Delaware used the automobile
exception tojustify a search,182 while Kentucky used the "reasonable evidence" prong. 183
When examining state court decisions involving Gant, there are several interesting
findings. First, there were more cases where the arrest began with a minor traffic offense than in
Federal Court. Fifteen cases involved arrests for offenses where it was not reasonable to believe
further evidence of the crime would be found in a search. These included seventeen arrests for
driving under a suspended license, two active warrants, and one for violation of a protective
order. Two searches were suppressed for invalid inventory searches, where there were no
standard operating procedures in place. Two cases involved frisks that were ruled unreasonable
searches, and two courts ruled that there was no plain view of evidence of a crime. Four cases
were ruled to be unreasonable seizures, where there was no articulable suspicion for the initial
detention. Another four cases were remanded to lower courts for hearings consistent with Gant.
In the forty-eight lower state court cases where searches were upheld, the majority were
for instances in which it was reasonable to believe that a search would reveal further evidence
of the crime. These included fourteen cases where drugs or drug paraphernalia were in plain
view, or where the defendant admitted to drug use. Two cases involved arrests for DUI, 184 and
there were four additional cases that fell under the second prong of Gant, including cases
where weapons were found and where stolen items were in plain view. 185 Four appeals were
175 A full comparison of the differences between federal and state courts is the subject of on-going
research by the authors, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
176 209 P.3d 711, 720 (Kan. 2009).
177 Perez v. People, 231 P.3d 957, 962 (Colo. 2010).
178 229 P.3d 650, 663 (Utah 2010).
179 Id. at 668.
180 United States v. Debruhl, 993 A.2d 571, 573 (D.C. 2010).
isi People v. Bridgewater, 918 N.E.2d 553, 557-58 (III. 2009); State v. Patton, 219 P.3d 651, 658 (Wash. 2009).
182 Hall v. State, 981 A.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Del. 2009).
183 Owens v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Ky. 2009).
184 State v. Cantrell, 233 P.3d 178 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010); People v. Mason, 935 N.E.2d 130 (2010).
185 See, e.g., Bishop v. State, 308 S.W.3d 14 (Tex. App. 2009).
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rejected as improvidently granted, due to the defendant not raising a suppression motion in the
original action. Courts in five states issued rulings establishing a good faith exception, although
one has been overruled by the state supreme court. 186 While one court in Washington
established a good faith exception, 187 other Washington state courts ruled on Gant issues in
another twenty-one cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The review of lower court decisions involving Gant issues in the year following the
decision provide evidence that the case is having an impact on police vehicle search practice.
Out of 125 federal cases where Gant was the controlling factor, almost 30 percent resulted in
rulings favorable to defendants. Defendants fared even better in state court decisions, where
courts ruled in their favor 56 percent of the time. While it is difficult to compare the number of
cases in which a defendant won prior to Gant, given that the New York v. Belton "bright line
rule" permitted vehicle searches after all arrests made in a vehicle, it is highly unlikely that
defendants would have evidence suppressed after a vehicle search, and even less likely that
they would prevail, since the success rate currently sits between 30 and 50 percent. As Justice
O'Connor pointed out in Thornton, 188 police viewed Belton as an entitlement, and there is ample
evidence to demonstrate that law enforcement agents routinely use pretextual traffic stops as a
means to execute a vehicle search after making a minor arrest. For these cases, where
individuals are arrested for driving under a suspended license, driving without proof of insurance,
and a host of other offenses where there is no reasonable basis for arguments of officer safety or
the need to find additional evidence of the crime, it is likely that police will be forced to find
other methods.
Gant leaves officers with several alternatives in these types of cases. First, they can try to
obtain consent to conduct a search. If they can demonstrate that consent is obtained
voluntarily and there is no evidence of coercion, it is likely to pass constitutional muster. Yet, even
here, officers need to be careful in how they proceed. Out of nine consent cases included in this
study, two searches were ruled improper by lower courts. Second, the automobile exception
remains a viable search option where officers can demonstrate probable cause of evidence of
criminal activity.189 That can be obtained under the plain view doctrine (e.g., smelling alcohol or
marijuana, viewing open bottles in the back seat) or through use of a K-9 unit to conduct a dog
sniff. 190
As the review of decisions demonstrates, the automobile exception (present in seven
federal and one state decision) is still a viable option for officers. Third, when officers can
legitimately make officer safety claims or demonstrate reasonable suspicion of the presence of
weapons, officers may be able to search the vehicle to do a protective sweep. While only three
cases in this review involved such facts, it is by no means prohibited.
When departments have written policies or established routine practices, they can
impound vehicles and then conduct an inventory search. Of the available options, this is
perhaps the most suspect because the purpose of an inventory search should not be a fishing
expedition to find criminal activity. Adding further support to the idea that suspect motives may
be behind inventory searches, the author of the FBI Bulletin's advice regarding inventory
searches stated that the purpose behind the advice was to find a way "around" Gant.191 Yet, as
the review of cases here suggests, courts may be unwilling to invalidate the use of inventory
186 People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Colo. 2010).
187 State v. Riley, 225 P.3d 462 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
188 Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
189 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
190 In most states, suspicionless dog searches are permitted at any traffic stop. See generally Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding such a search does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
19i Schott, supra note 118.
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searches except in rare circumstances. And while the issue of inventory searches viewed in light
of Gant may ultimately make it to the Supreme Court, it is uncertain how the Court would rule. It
is possible that the Supreme Court would reject the strategy of using inventory searches if it is
clear that the impoundment is merely a pretext for a search without probable cause. Yet, as
long as police are careful to make sure that there is an "innocent" explanation of their behavior,
the chances are that the Court will allow it. The future use of inventory searches by police is
deserving of further research.
A. DOES GANT REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?
Arizona v. Gant certainly sent shock waves through law enforcement in the first few
months after it was handed down. The case undid almost thirty years of police practice, and it
has the potential to force law enforcement to find new ways to conduct criminal investigations.
Only time will tell how great the change may be. Yet, what Gant does not appear to be is a
fundamental shift in the Court's overall crime control jurisprudence. While Gant places limits on
police practice, there are few signs within the decision that the case truly represents a paradigm
shift. Much of the criticism of Belton in the opinions of Justices Stevens and Scalia focus more on
the logical flaws in the argument underlying Belton's bright-line rule. The Court did not focus on
the rights of the accused in the same way as many dissents by Justices Marshall and Brennan in
earlier crime control decisions. 192
Gant also stands alone in recent search and seizure cases. In recent years, most of the
Court's criminal procedure decisions have been squarely on the side of crime control. For
example, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court unanimously ruled that the Fourth Amendment was not
violated when police arrested someone for an offense for which state law only permitted a
summons, and refused to suppress the evidence of drugs found in the subsequent search
incident to arrest. 193 In Arizona v. Johnson, the Court reaffirmed the holdings of Terry v. Ohio1 94
and Brendlin v. California,195 and further held that an officer's questioning about matters
unrelated to the original stop does not change the encounter into something other than a lawful
seizure. 196 In another 2009 decision, the Court held in Herring v. United States that the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule applied when an officer made an arrest based on an
outstanding warrant in another jurisdiction, even though that warrant was invalid. 197 Indeed, with
the exception of Gant, there have been few criminal procedure decisions in recent years that
would indicate a shift in the Court's general approach to the Fourth Amendment. More recently,
that trend has continued in the Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, which narrowed the
192 See, e.g., Justice Brennan's dissent in Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454, 468 (1981), overruled by Arizona v.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2008):
Under the approach taken today, the result would presumably be the same even if Officer Nicot had
handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under arrest, and even
if his search had extended to locked luggage or other inaccessible containers located in the back
seat of the car.
See also Marshall's dissents in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 384-96 (1976), and United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544-62 (1975). In Peltier, Marshall bitterly states,
If a majority of my colleagues are determined to discard the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment
cases, they should forthrightly do so, and be done with it. This business of slow strangulation of the rule,
with no opportunity afforded parties most concerned to be heard, would be indefensible in any
circumstances.
Peltier, 422 U.S. at 561-62.
193 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
194 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
195 551 U.S. 249, 256-57 (2007) (holding that the driver and all passengers of a vehicle are considered seized
for the duration of a lawful traffic stop).
196 Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009).
197 555 U.S. 135; 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009).
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applicability of Miranda advisements by requiring defendants to explicitly invoke their right to
remain silent.198
It is also unclear how the Court will decide similar cases in the future. Gant was a 5-4
decision, and two members of the majority, Justices Souter and Stevens, have since left the
court. While it is not likely that Justice Sotomayor would join with the dissenters to overrule Gant,
any predictions about how she will vote are certainly premature. Further, while Justice
Sotomayor represents a question mark on the Court, the appointment of Elena Kagan to
replace Justice Stevens raises even more questions due to her virtually non-existent record on
criminal procedure issues.
Regardless of what Gant means for the long term future of the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, in the short term, police officers will need to adapt to the decision. Anecdotal
evidence certainly indicates that officers and prosecuting attorneys are taking this matter
seriously and that it will have an impact on the ability of police to use pretextual stops as a tool
in the ongoing effort to limit traffic in illegal drugs. As new cases come to the Court, the extent to
which Gant marks a sea change will become more apparent. The decision has had an
immediate impact on law enforcement, and further research of the decision's reach on police
practice and the use of vehicle searches is merited.
198 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), reh'g denied, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 131 S. Ct. 33 (2010).
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BOOK REVIEW
An Interrupted Life: Experiences of Incarcerated Women
in the United States'
By Rickie Solinger, Paula C. Johnson, Martha L. Raimon, Tina Reynolds, and
Ruby C. Tapia, eds.
Book Review by Kris Miccio, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver
AN INTERRUPTED LIFE is a compilation of essays on the experiences of women inmates
which brings home to practitioner, advocate, scholar, and educator what life is like for women
behind U.S. prison walls. Much of the literature, as well as popular culture, on prison life is passed
through the prism of male experience, and thus gives short shrift to the complicated lives that
woman lead in prison. Solinger et. al have presented a compendium of essays which address
the issues faced by mothers and women of color as they cope with life behind bars and life
after prison.
The authors have used storytelling, poetry, and first person accounts to bring to life how
women create families behind the walls and sustain families outside prison. An interesting fact
which emerges from this book is that the majority of women inmates are mothers of minor
children. AN INTERRUTED LIFE gives insight into how these women maintain their role as mother
as well as what they face if that role is interrupted due to their child's placement in foster care.
What comes through is that inmates still feel a connection to their children which transcends the
bars and the regulated - and at times isolated - life that these incarcerated mothers face.
We also learn how some inmates attempt to reproduce familial units within the prison by
becoming involved as mothers to younger inmates, lovers to others, and sisters to sisters. What
develops is an intricate system of sisterhood which serves to protect all members of the family
structure. Such units also provide the women with sexual intimacy, if that is what they choose,
and for some it recasts previous beliefs about sexuality, resulting in a redefinition which can fall
outside cultural boundaries.
One interesting aspect of the book is how women inmates resist the oppression that is
part of prison life and the loss of privacy that follows a life behind bars. While some resort to
violence, many women choose poetry, prayer, or spirituality as a means of refusing the
categorization that accompanies prison life. What is clear is that these women use writing,
poetry, and spirituality as more than a survival tool but as instruments to redefine themselves and
to rise above the grinding life imposed by the state.
AN INTERRUPTED LIFE is not an easy read because it deals with both facts and raw
emotion. However, it is an important book for any scholar, lawyer, advocate, or educator who
wishes to gain insight into what women inmates face. And it is an interesting counterpoint to
those who would find such lives expendable and unworthy of concern. AN INTERRUPTED LIFE is
an important book for those of us in the Academy who teach criminal law because it gives
insight into the consequences of a system which places human lives outside the ambit of
compassion and care. And finally, it is an essential read because it reminds us that the dignity of
the human spirit can rise up even behind the walls of U.S. prisons.
1 Rickie Solinger, Paula C. Johnson, Martha L. Raimon, eds. An Interrupted Life: Experiences of
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SIXTH AMENDMENT RISING:
THE NEWLY EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR
TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Robert Hardawayi
"(We must) remain true to the principles that emerged from the framer's "fears' that the jury right
could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion... (A jury must try) all facts necessary to
constitute a statutory offense..."
-Justice Stevens writing for the majority in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)2
1. INTRODUCTION
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is enshrined in Article Ill, Section 2, Clause 3 of the
U.S. Constitution which provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury." 3 Although this appears to render superfluous the Sixth Amendment guarantee
that, " [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a...trial by an impartial
jury,"4 the repeat of this right in the Bill of Rights serves to highlight its importance in the minds of
the framers.
Likewise, in civil suits at common law where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars, the Seventh Amendment provides that "the right to trial by jury shall be preserved..." 5
The Seventh Amendment, unlike the Sixth,6 has never been found to be an essential
element of due process, and thus has never been applied to the states via incorporation into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
been meticulous in enforcing its provisions to the letter in the federal courts, holding that civil
I Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The views expressed herein are my own and
do not necessarily reflect the views of any of my colleagues at the Sturm College of Law. I also wish to
acknowledge and give credit to Judge Morris B. Hoffman, District Judge for the Second Judicial District of
Colorado. I have borrowed liberally from his excellent article in the Duke Law Journal which was published
in 2003 and entitled The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003). Although that article focused
primarily on the historical, empirical and policy case for jury sentencing, his seven page constitutional case
for jury sentencing set forth the most articulate constitutional case for jury sentencing in the aftermath of
Apprendi, and provided the seeds and basis for what is essentially my 2003-2010 update to his
constitutional case.
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2000).
3 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl.3. However, unlike the 6th amendment, art. III § 2, cl. 3 does not state that it applies
to "all criminal prosecutions.' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Skilling v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2912-13 (2010); Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1396
(2010) (Thomas, J. concurring); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 n. 3 (2002); Harris v. U.S., 536 U.S. 545, 549
(2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000); U.S. v. Rodriguez- Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 278
(1999); Lewis v. U.S., 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996); U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 445 (2001)
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 n.22 (1999); City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999).
6 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
7 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (citing Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1876)); Id. at n. 14; See also Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951,
n. 72 (2003).
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litigants in suits at common law have a right to a jury in both phases of the civil trial. Specifically,
civil litigants have a right to have a jury determine both the defendant's liability, as well as the
amount of damages to which a plaintiff is entitled if liability is determined.8
Given the court's scrupulous upholding and enforcement of the Seventh Amendment's
right to a jury in all phases of civil cases involving complaints for money, it is all the more surprising
that in criminal cases, where an accused faces loss of liberty or even death, many courts --
indeed, most courts -- routinely deny an accused the right to jury in the most critical phase of the
criminal trial, namely the sentencing phase.9 While courts routinely accord an accused a right
to a jury in the guilt or innocence phase, 10 an accused's actual sentence is routinely left to the
mercy of an individual judge who, depending on his mood or predilection, has the broadest
discretion in imposing a sentence. Not surprisingly, such a sentence may range anywhere from
no punishment at all, punishment that is suspended along with probation, to life imprisonment.11
Inexplicably, most legislative attempts to address this kind of unbridled judicial discretion
have come not in the form of simply requiring judicial adherence to the Sixth Amendment, but
rather by promulgating so-called "sentencing guidelines." 12 The success of such guidelines is
unclear however; specifically such success is unclear in light of judicial attempts in some lower
courts to undermine or bypass this type of limitation on judicial discretion. 13 In fact, higher courts
have also attempted to bypass these limitations; leading these courts into thickets of legal
obfuscation so dense that one senses desperation on their part in later cases to somehow find a
way out of them. 14
Interestingly, if a federal court today held that the right to a jury in civil cases extended
only to the first half of a civil trial and then denied the right of a plaintiff to have his damages
determined by a jury, there would be an explosion of outrage. Such outrage would reflect a
blatant denial of the rights guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, not only on the part of the
trial bar, but by the general citizenry-and rightly so. What is the explanation, then, for such
general acquiescence to the right of men and women being marched into captivity based on
8 See, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990);
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1966); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959); I.L.C. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Judge Morris Hoffman, in his Duke Law Review article
"The Case for Jury Sentencing' has set forth in comprehensive detail the high court cases which have
attempted to distinguish the Sixth and Seventh Amendments and explain why a civil litigant is accorded a
right to jury in both phases of a civil trial, but an accused only has a right to jury in the first phase of a
criminal trial. See e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003). Accordingly,
no attempt is made to treat that subject here.
9 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 4; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-103 (1987); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.036 (West 1999); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 926.1, 927.1 (West Supp. 2003); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07(2) (b) (West 2006);
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295 (West 2007).
10 Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995); Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
ii Hoffman, supra note 7, at 987, 994-95; U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (citing Apprendi v New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)); See also Apprendi, 530 U.S.
466, 547-48 (2000) (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553; USSG; 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (describing Sentencing Commission's duties); Booker 543 U.S.
at 245; Jackson Jones, The United States Sentencing Guidelines are not Law!: Establishing the reasons
"United States Sentencing Guidelines" and "Ex Post Facto Clause" Should Never be used in the Some
Sentence, 32 U. La Verne L. Rev. 7, 14-17 (2010) (describing the history and purposes of the federal
sentencing guidelines).
13 See e.g. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bowers, 242 Fed. Appx.
558, 559-60 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Burdex, 100 F.3d 882, 884-86 (10th Cir. 1996).
14 See e.g Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
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the decision of a single man or woman? More pointedly, was this what the framers had in mind
when they promulgated the Sixth Amendment command to provide an accused the right to a
trial by jury in all criminal cases? And if it was not, what is the explanation for how the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial came to be so diluted during the same period of American
judicial history when the Seventh Amendment came to be so meticulously and scrupulously
adhered to?
The public policy arguments in favor of jury sentencing can already be found in scholarly
literature. Notably, Chief Justice William Rehnquist has remarked that "[i]ndividual sentencing
juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the complex
societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of publicly acceptable criminal
punishments." 15
Standing in stark contrast to the current sentencing norms, military courts feature a court
panel (analogous to the jury in civilian courts) which decides both guilt as well as punishment, if
necessary. As a JAG officer, I practiced in these latter courts and I was always impressed by the
fairness of sentences imposed by the jury. Also impressive was the procedure under which an
accused was able to present his own extenuation and mitigation evidence without fear that a
heavily bureaucratized probation department would attempt to influence the court with reports
featuring hearsay and other uncross-examined sources. 16
Currently a handful of states provide its accused with the right to a jury trial during
sentencing.17 However, following the lead of Chief Justice Rehnquist, there have been a
number of scholars who have made an empirical and public policy case for jury sentencing in
criminal cases.18 In fact, one of the more persuasive and eloquent public policy cases for jury
sentencing has been recently set forth by Yale law student Adriana Lamni in a Note in the Yale
Law Journal19 -- which garnered praise from Denver District Court Judge Morris Hoffman as the
"first article in eighty-one years to call for a return to jury sentencing." 20
With the Chief Justice's public policy case for jury sentencing foundationally in mind,
along with the 2000 Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,21 and also Judge
Hoffman's remarkable article22 in the Duke Law Journal, this article will focus on the constitutional
case for jury sentencing in criminal cases.
15 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
16 See 57 C.J.S. Generally § 580 (2010); 57 C.J.S. Deliberations and Voting § 585 (2010)
i7 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (West 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 926.1,
927.1 (West 2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07(2) (b) (Vernon 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295
(West 2000) (as cited in Hoffman, supra note 7, at 953 n.1as the only five states that allow for jury sentencing
for noncapital offenses); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 954 n.4 ("Of the thirty-eight states with capital
punishment, twenty-nine leave the sentencing decision to the jury. At least before Rina v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), only five states--Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska--gave the trial court judge,
or a panel of judges, the exclusive power to decide the capital punishment issue.').
is Hoffman, supra note 7; Adriann Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An idea Whose Time Has
Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775 (1999).
19 Lanni, supra note 18.
20 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 951 n.d1.
21 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2000).
22 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 968-85.
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II. HISTORY
Although the phrase "shall be preserved" regarding the right to jury trial is found only in
the Seventh Amendment, 23 and not the Sixth, it follows that the right to jury trial in criminal cases
was likewise meant to preserve the right to jury in criminal cases as it existed at the time that
both Section III and the Sixth Amendment were ratified. As Judge Hoffman has noted, judges at
common law had almost no discretion in imposing sentences at the relevant time since " [m]ost
offenses had mandatorily set punishments." 24 Accordingly, the judge's role in sentencing was
largely perfunctory and formalistic, and was, therefore, "simply to announce the mandatory
punishment." 25 Because these juries effectively imposed punishment by the simple expedient of
deciding what crime the accused was guilty of, it was inconceivable at that time that the judge
would in any way interfere with the jury's constitutional power to impose a sentence.
Although "judges sentenced in name only,"26 an illusion was nevertheless created in the
minds of future jurists that judges had actually been imposing sentences all along rather than
simply ritualistically announcing the sentence for the record. As the common law practice of
jury sentencing as it existed at ratification receded in the collective judicial memory, judges
began a gradual usurpation of the traditional common law jury function of imposing sentences
in criminal cases.27 Such gradual usurpations were created, in large part, by the muddling of the
waters by legislative promulgations that created the "indeterminate sentence." 28  Such
legislative promulgations created an indisputably visible spectacle of a present day judge
confidently announcing a sentence -- even mechanistically -- from the bench and would
eventually have far reaching consequences for constitutional analysis.
It was not long before the common law practice in effect at the time of constitutional
ratification became totally lost in the collective judicial memory. As a consequence of such
memory loss, judges began a lengthy and effective usurpation of the constitutional function of
the criminal jury without serious constitutional challenge.29 In fact, it was not until the modern era
that serious constitutional challenges to the usurpation of the jury function in criminal cases were
raised, a number of which arose in death penalty cases.30 In 1984, Spaziano v. Florida,31 for
23City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (citing Bvrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coooerative, Inc.. 356 US. 525,
537 (1958)); Markman v. Westview, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1987) (quoting
CoIarove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973)); Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 153 (1973); Id. at 171 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
24 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 962.
25 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 (quoting John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the
French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, pp. 36-37 (Antonio Padoa
Schioppa ed. 1987)) ("Thus, with respect to the criminal law of felonious conduct, 'the English trial judge of
the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing. The substantive criminal law
tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The judge was meant
simply to impose that sentence ..... '); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 962.
26 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 963.
27 See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 964-65; John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The
Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 119-21 (1992); Chris Kemmitt, Function
over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury's Historical Role as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93,95-96
(2006); Ronald Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1374-75 (1999) ("Enthusiasm for
sentencing juries grew out of an American passion for juries as the institution that best enabled citizens to
participate in their own government. This conviction was never stronger than during the early nineteenth
century. It was early in the twentieth century when states started to limit or abandon jury sentencing and to
give judges the power to set the initial sentence in every case.').
28 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1001.
29 See sources cited supra n. 26.
30 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990);; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447 (1984). See also such non death penalty cases as Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
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example, featured an accused who was sentenced to death by a judge despite a jury
recommendation of a life sentence. Although the accused appealed his sentence primarily on
Eighth Amendment grounds, the court was blindsided by a secondary claim that the judge had
violated the accused's Sixth Amendment rights by usurping the jury sentence. In addressing this
claim, an apparently non-plussed majority could not muster a single case in suppor of its dictum
that "[t]he Sixth amendment has never been thought to guarantee a right to a jury
determination of that [death penalty] issue." 32
The court's tentative dictum that the right to a jury trial in criminal sentencing has not
been "thought" to be a Sixth Amendment right appears far removed from an outright assertion,
with authority, that that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury in the second phase of a
criminal trial. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that Spaziano, and presumably its feeble
dictum, was undermined by a 2002 decision, Ring v. Arizona, in which the Court held that it was
a violation of the Sixth Amendment for a judge to decide whether there were aggravating
factors justifying execution.33 In fact, the concurring opinion in Ring went even further,
concluding that the Constitution requires "jury sentencing in capital cases..."34
Judicial resistance to acknowledgment of a Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing
however still exists and is often attributed to dictum in such cases as the 1986 case, McMillan v.
Pennsylvania ("There is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing... "),35 though Ring could
muster only the later discredited Spaziano case in support of this contention.
In any case, any dictum regarding a Sixth Amendment right to sentencing which was
handed down prior to 2000 must now be reevaluated in the aftermath of Apprendi and its
progeny, initiating an evolution in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence comparable in scope to the
evolution of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence which occurred in the aftermath of Miranda v.
Arizona .36
III. APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY
In the 2000 Supreme Court case Apprendi v. New Jersey,37 the accused fired several
shots into the home of an African American couple and was subsequently charged with second
degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose which carried a 5-10 year term, but was
notably not charged with violation of a separate hate crime statute. After the defendant pled
guilty to the firearms charge, however, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the shooting was racially motivated, a factor which if found enhanced punishment under
the statute, and sentenced the accused to a 12-year term. The accused appealed on grounds
(2004) (kidnapping); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (possession of firearm and antipersonnel
bomb); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (possession of firearm during commission of enumerated
felony).
31 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449.
32 Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
33 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
34 Id. at 614 (Breyer, J. concurring). Interestingly, this assertion of a constitutional right to sentencing in
capital cases was based on the Eighth rather than Sixth Amendment. This is somewhat curious as the
Eighth Amendment has generally been applied in the context of the nature of the punishment itself rather
than the procedures under which the punishment was imposed. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J.
concurring) (quoting Garder v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) " [T]he prohibition of
the Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by which it is
imposed').
35 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
36 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also cases that came after Miranda, such as Maryland v.
Shatzer, 130 S.C. 1213 (2010); U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000);
Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
37 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
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that the Due Process clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for the crime
beyond the statutory minimum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 8
Because the trial judge had enhanced the punishment of the defendant based on his
own personal factual finding of racial motivation rather than on any jury finding of racial
motivation, the Court held that New Jersey's practice violated the accused's due process rights.
Specifically, the Court held that, except for the fact of a prior conviction: "... any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 39 The Court went on to make clear that " [i]t
is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase
the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." 40 It cited with
approval a common law doctrine which holds that:
[w]here a statute annexes a higher degree of punishment to a common-law felony, if
committed under particular circumstances, an indictment for the offence, in order to bring
the defendant within that higher degree of punishment, must expressly charge it to have
been committed under those circumstances, and must state the circumstances with
certainty and precision. If, then, "upon an indictment under the statute, the prosecutor
prove the felony to have been committed, but fail in proving it to have been committed
under the circumstances specified in the statute, the defendant shall be convicted of the
common-law felony only.' 41
Thus, with one fell swoop, the Court cast away many of the fine distinctions that
theretofore had been made between the need for jury determination of facts which were
"elements" of a crime, and facts which were merely "factors" in determining mitigation of
punishment42, holding that, regardless of classification as an element or "sentencing factor," "
[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any [emphasis added] fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury. . . ." 43The
38/d. at 476-77(quoting U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any
deprivation of liberty without "due process of law," and the guarantee that " [iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,"
Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to "a jury determination that
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt
[citiatoins omitted].
39 Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
40 Id. (quoting Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J. concurring); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at
253 (Scalia, J. concurring).
41 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480-81 (quoting 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown, in turn cited in J. Archbold, Pleading
and Evidence in Criminal Cases, 15th ed. 44, 51 (1862)).
42 See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related
to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic
procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the
accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in
previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant
is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally
required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory
defense at issue here. This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof
by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes.
But there are obviously limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard.
43 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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dissent in Apprendi, transparently horrified at the implications of the majority opinion, noted that
while "all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense" 44 must be tried by a jury - the majority
opinion "casts aside our traditional cautious approach and instead embraces a universal and
seemingly bright-line rule limiting the power of congress and state legislatures to define criminal
offenses and the sentences that follow from convictions thereunder." 45 Uncontrovertibly, the
dissent recognized that the Court had set forth an "extraordinary rule." 46
But just how extraordinary?
If the only implication of the majority decision was to set forth yet another judicial
guideline for applying the legislature's federal sentencing guidelines, there would be little cause
for alarm on the part of those who fear its logical extension-namely, that the accused has a
Sixth Amendment right to a jury not just in the first phase of a criminal trial, but also in the second,
and more critical phase, of sentencing.
IV. BREAKING THE DOCTRINAL DEADLOCK
As early as 2003, Judge Hoffman made the case that in a pair of post-Apprendi cases,
Ring v. Arizona47 and Harris v. U.S.,48 the Court appeared to have dug itself into a doctrinal
conundrum from which the only escape was recognition of the original premise of the Sixth
Amendment: to provide to an accused the right of trial by jury in all phases of the criminal trial.49
Hoffman's constitutional case for jury sentencing began by recalling that while Apprendi
required that "any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime" must be tried by jury, it left open the question of whether the Sixth Amendment also
required that any fact that increased the minimum requirement also be tried by a jury.50
Hoffman noted that in the 2002 case of Ring v. Arizona, 51 the Court cleanly applied the
Apprendi doctrine in striking down, on Sixth Amendment grounds, an Arizona statute which
permitted a judge to determine the aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty. In
Harris v. U.S.,52 however, decided the same day as Ring, the Court upheld a statute which
mandated a seven-year minimum sentence upon a judicial finding that the accused had
brandished a gun. This pair of cases , taken together, therefore appeared to answer the
question left open by Apprendi by holding that judicial findings of facts that might increase a
maximum sentence are necessarily to be considered as "elements" of a crime regardless of
whether they are labeled as elements or sentencing factors by a legislature, and must be
decided by a jury; but those judicial findings which required imposition of a minimum sentence,
and legislatively determined to be mere "sentencing factors," pass Sixth Amendment muster if
decided by a judge alone.
Judge Hoffman recognized the conundrum posed by these two cases, pointing out that
they have created an "impossibly difficult saddle point:"
If the Sixth Amendment means anything, it must mean that legislatures cannot deprive
criminal defendants of their right to jury trial by the simple artifice of labeling elements as
"sentencing factors'; yet there seems to be no principled basis upon which to distinguish
elements from sentencing factors. This dilemma is so sharp that the slightest change of
44/d. at 483.
45 Id. at 525.
46 
Id.
47 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
48 Harris v. U.S, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
49 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 982.
so id at 981.
si Hoffman, supra note 7, at 980 (describing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
52 Hfrris, 536 U.S. at 552.
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perspective or wording by one or two Justices seems to have a magnified effect on
outcomes in these cases. 53
Contrary to Judge Hoffman's observation, however, the Ring-HarriS 54 pair did provide a
basis for distinguishing between "elements" which must be decided by a jury, and "sentencing
factors" which may be tried by a judge-namely, that factors which increase the maximum
must be treated as "elements" regardless of legislative labeling, while factors which increase the
minimum may be treated as sentencing factors if labeled as such legislatively.
The conundrum, therefore, is not to be found in any ambiguity in the setting forth of the
principle, but rather in the doctrinal soundness of the principle itself, and perhaps this is what
Judge Hoffman meant in his assertion that Ring-Harris set forth no "principled" basis for
distinguishing between elements and sentencing factors. It should also be noted, however, that
Hoffman's claim that legislatures now have a free path to bypass Apprendi by the simple
expedient of "increasing maximum sentences to accommodate what would otherwise have
been an enhanced sentence and then imposing higher and/or mandatory minimum sentences
to reflect the enhancement" was thoroughly addressed in Apprendi by Justice Stevens who
opined that if legislatures attempted any such course, the Court would consider whether it was
constitutional by falling back on such pre-Apprendi decisions as Patterson 55 and Mullaney.
5 6 57
Nevertheless, the post-Apprendi cases decided up to and including those decided
through 2010 which have attempted to tread the ultimately hapless doctrinal path through the
Ring-Harris thicket58 do support Judge Hoffman's conclusion, first articulated in 2003 in the
aftermath of that pair of cases, that the only principled way for the court to escape the current
doctrinal morass is to hold that under the Sixth Amendment "judges will not ... be able to impose
any sentences."5 9
53 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 982.
54 See 536 U.S. 584, 604-06 n.5, 609(2002); 536 U.S. 545, 557-561 (2002).
5s Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
56 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
57 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n. 16 (2000) ('The principal dissent would reject the Court's rule
as a "meaningless formalism,' because it can conceive of hypothetical statutes that would comply with
the rule and achieve the same result as the New Jersey statute. Post, at 2388-2390. While a State could,
hypothetically, undertake to revise its entire criminal code in the manner the dissent suggests, post, at 2389-
extending all statutory maximum sentences to, for example, 50 years and giving judges guided discretion
as to a few specially selected factors within that range-this possibility seems remote. Among other reasons,
structural democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures from enacting penal statutes that expose
every defendant convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that
which is, in the legislature's judgment, generally proportional to the crime. This is as it should be. Our rule
ensures that a State is obliged 'to make its choices concerning the substantive content of its criminal laws
with full awareness of the consequences, unable to mask substantive policy choices" of exposing all who
are convicted to the maximum sentence it provides. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S., at 228-229, n. 13,
(Powell, J., dissenting). So exposed, " [t]he political check on potentially harsh legislative action is then more
likely to operate." Ibid. In all events, if such an extensive revision of the State's entire criminal code were
enacted for the purpose the dissent suggests, or if New Jersey simply reversed the burden of the hate crime
finding (effectively assuming a crime was performed with a purpose to intimidate and then requiring a
defendant to prove that it was not, post, at 2390), we would be required to question whether the revision
was constitutional under this Court's prior decisions. See Patterson, 432 U.S., at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319; Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-702, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) ").
58 See, e.g., Dillion v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010); United States v. O'Brien, 130 S.Ct. 2169, 2173-
2175 (2010); Oregon v. Ice, 129 S.Ct. 711, 716-18 (2009); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352-55 (2007);
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 282-89 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230-38 (2005);
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24-27 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-06 (2004); Schriro
v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353-56 (2004).
s9 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 985.
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V. CONCLUSION
The central holding of Apprendi that the Sixth Amendment requires that "all facts
necessary to constitute a statutory offense" must be "tr(ied) to a jury"60 has laid the foundation
for establishing the principle originally envisioned by the framers of establishing a wide barrier
between an accused and the vast power of the state.61 The gradual judicial usurpation of the
accused's right to a jury during the second critical phase of the criminal trial confirms the Sixth
Amendment framers' fear "that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by
erosion." 62 Such judicial usurpation also stands in dire contrast to the continued and meticulous
judicial recognition of the right to a jury in all phases of the civil trial under the Seventh
Amendment. 63
There exists no precedential or stare decisis barriers to recognition of a Sixth Amendment
guarantee to an accused's right of trial by jury in the most critical sentencing phase of his trial,
either in the unsupported dictum of the pre-Apprendi caseS 64 or in dictum in post-Apprendi
cases referring to pre-Apprendi cases.
Only a full recognition of the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment can resolve the
current doctrinal mass of cases, particularly those cases that have become entangled in
attempting to reconcile both state and federal cases applying sentencing guidelines. 65
Although the doctrinal leap from the Apprendi holding to one recognizing a Sixth
Amendment right to jury sentencing would be a relatively small one, the practical implications
would be significant for the criminal justice system. Notably though, the court in recent years
has not hesitated to make similar dramatic doctrinal expansions in the criminal justice field. For
example, in the 2004 case of Crawford v. Washington, 66 the Supreme Court did not hesitate to
abandon the holding of Roberts v. Ohio, which had held that the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation clause could be satisfied without physical confrontation of a witness in court by a
showing that a witness was unavailable and that his out of court statement satisfied a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception.67 In that case, the court discarded many decades of judicial
precedent, and instead relied upon common law practice as it existed in 1791.68
Additionally, and as recently as June of 2010, the Supreme Court, examining practice
and legislative history from 1791, overturned 70 years of precedent and a consensus of circuit
cases 69 to hold that the Second Amendment was an individual rather than collective right. 70
60 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483.
61 Id. at 477 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)).
62 Id. at 483 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999)).
63 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-83 (1996); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564-67 (1990); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152-64 (1973);
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-40 (1966); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471-79 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-49 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
64 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984). Discussed
supra p. 6.
65 See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010); United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010);
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Cunningham v. California, 549
U.S. 270 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
66 Crawford v. Washington, 541. U.S. 36 (2004).
67 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
68 541 U.S. at 54-59.
69 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) ("The second amendment guarantees no right
to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia.'") (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)); United
States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir.
1999); San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1996); Hickman v. Block,
81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v.
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Nevertheless, any future judicial attempts to make such a doctrinal leap will doubtless
become mired in the conceptual sinkholes opened up by such post-Apprendi cases as U.S. v.
Booker (which can be read as requiring application of Apprendi only in the context of
mandatory sentencing guidelines, and leaves open the possibility of judge sentencing in a non-
mandatory sentencing regime)71, and Oregon v. Ice 72 (which held that the Sixth Amendment
does not inhibit a judge from finding facts relevant to whether consecutive rather than
concurrent sentences should be imposed.)
It is therefore submitted that only a clean doctrinal leap in the form of a clear cut holding
that a defendant in a criminal case has a Sixth Amendment right to have his sentence
determined by a jury can extricate the courts from the current doctrinal morass while at the
same time serving both the spirit and letter of the constitutional right to jury in both phases of the
criminal trial.
As has already occurred in Fifth Amendment 73 and Confrontation 74 jurisprudence, half a
loaf, and even three quarters of a loaf, must inevitably give way to a full one.
Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wilbur, 545 F.2d 764, 767 (1st Cir. 1976); Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-23 (1st Cir. 1942); see also Robert Hardaway, The inconvenient Militia Clause
of the Second Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate over the Right to Bear
Arms, 16 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 43 n.12 (2002) (providing a more extensive list of supporting cases).
70 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2010).
71 Booker, 543 U.S.at 334 ( Breyer, J. dissenting)
Thus, as far as the federal statutes are concerned, the federal system, unlike the state system at
issue in Blakely, provides a defendant with no guarantee that the jury's finding of factual elements
will result in a sentence lower than the statutory maximum. Rather, the statutes put a potential
federal defendant on notice that a judge conceivably might sentence him anywhere within the
range provided by statute-regardless of the applicable Guidelines range. Hence as a practical
matter, they grant a potential federal defendant less assurance of a lower Guidelines sentence
than did the state statutes at issue in Blakely.
72 ICE, 129 S.Ct. at 718
In light of this history, legislative reforms regarding the imposition of multiple sentences do not implicate
the core concerns that prompted our decision in Apprendi. There is no encroachment here by the
judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor any threat to the jury's domain as a bulwark at trial
between the State and the accused. Instead, the defendant-who historically may have faced
consecutive sentences by default-has been granted by some modern legislatures statutory protections
meant to temper the harshness of the historical practice.
73 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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